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The aim of this paper is to consider how the European Community 
Environment Policy has been interpreted in relation to the harvesting of living 
natural resources.  It is suggested that the Policy entails certain 
preconceptions as to the character of the environmental problems that it is 
intended to address and the way in which those problems should be 
addressed.  Whilst these preconceptions may not be especially problematic in 
contexts where pollution-related impacts are involved, they raise especial 
difficulties where sustainable management of ecological resources is at issue.   
 
The need for integration of environment requirements across all sectors of 
Community activity entails that they should be implemented in the 
Community’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and discussion is provided of 
the ways in which environmental concerns have been accommodated within 
that Policy.  Specifically, this involves an examination of the way in which the 
precautionary principle has been interpreted in the fishery management 
context and the application of an ecosystem approach to fisheries.  This 
investigation is conducted against a background of reforms of the CFP, 
instigated from 2002 onwards, and the evaluation of those reforms in respect 
of subsequent actions and indications as to their ecological effectiveness.   
 
Under the influence of various international initiatives, requiring precautionary 
reference points to be used to activate management actions to maintain or 
restore fish stocks, it is evident that ‘precaution’ has been interpreted in a 
peculiar sense within the reformed CFP.  Comparisons are drawn with an 
interpretation of ‘precaution’ that has been adopted in relation to nature 
conservation and discussion is provided as to the potential relevance of 
alternative interpretations in fishery contexts.  It is suggested that there is no 
reason why a stricter form of precaution should not be applied to fisheries 
management, involving the burden of showing the absence of harm being 
placed upon those seeking authorise, or to engage, in the activity.  However, 
the socio-economic costs of precautionary action must be balanced against 
the gravity of the environmental problem being addressed.   
 
Whilst the reforms of the CFP are broadly welcomed, concerns are expressed 
that the rhetoric of the revised policy may not be matched by the realities of 
the actions that are taken in the challenge of securing sustainably managed 
Community fisheries.  In summary, depending on the effectiveness of the 
existing measures, there may still be a need for a more precautionary 
approach to be applied.   
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2. The European Community Environment Policy 
 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the European Community in relation to 
the environment is the establishment of an explicit basis for action under its 
Environment Policy.1  The European Community Treaty clearly sets out the 
objectives of the Policy, the environmental action principles upon which it is 
based and the factors that are to be taken into account in its application.2  The 
systematic articulation of these matters is a triumph when contrasted with the 
ad hoc approach that previously prevailed in national environmental 
legislation, but the elements of the Policy also raise fundamental questions.  
Whilst much of the academic literature has tended to concentrate upon the 
problematic issue of the extent to which the environmental action principles 
are legally binding in character,3 the initial focus here is upon the character of 
the environmental challenge that is envisaged by those principles.  
Specifically, do the stated objectives, principles and factors which are set out 
in the Policy entail certain preconceptions as to the kinds of ‘environmental 
problems’ that need to be addressed and/or the manner in which they need to 
be addressed?   
 
Amongst other things, the Environment Policy recognises the distinct 
objectives of ‘preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment’ and the ‘prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources’.4  
However, the general aim of securing a ‘high level of protection’ is to be 
based upon application of environmental action principles, encompassing the 
precautionary principle, the preventative principle and the polluter pays 
                                            
* An earlier draft of this paper was helpfully commented on by Donald McGillivray, University 
of Kent, and delivered and discussed at the Conference of the Society of Legal Scholars at 
the University of Durham on 12 September 2007.  The author is extremely grateful for these 
comments, which have helped shape the final version of the paper, but remains entirely 
responsible for any errors that remain.  
 
1 Under Art.174 European Community Treaty.   
2 For general discussion of the role of environmental action principles in EC Environmental 
Policy see, N. de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles (2002); G. Winter, ‘Environmental 
Principles in Community Law’ in J. H. Jans, Ed. The European Convention and the Future of 
European Environmental Law (2003) p.3; L. Kramer, EC Environmental Law (5th ed. 2003) 
p.7; and R. Macrory, Ed., Principles of European Environmental Law (2004).   
3 See, for example, O. McIntyre, ‘The Guiding Principles of European Community 
Environmental Law-Making’ (1994) European Environment 23; S. Tromans, ‘High Talk and 
Low Cunning: Putting Environmental Principles into Legal Practice’ [1995] Journal of Planning 
and Environment Law 779; J. Holder, ‘Safe Science? The precautionary principle in UK 
environmental law’, in J. Holder, Ed., The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the United 
Kingdom (1997); M. Doherty, ‘The Judicial Use of the Principles of EC Environmental Policy’ 
[2000] Environmental Law Review 251; E. Fisher, ‘Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?’ 
[2001] Journal of Environmental Law 315; R. Lee, ‘(Pre)cautionary Tales: Risk, Regulation 
and the Precautionary Principle’ in J. Boswell and R. Lee, Eds., Economics Ethics & the 
Environment (2002) p.87; M. Doherty, ‘Hard Cases and Environmental Principles: An Aid to 
Interpretation?’ (2003) 3 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 57; J. Scott, ‘The 
Precautionary Principle before the European Courts’ in R. Macrory, Ed., Principles of 
European Environmental Law (2004) at p.51; and A. Epiney, ‘Environmental Principles’ in R. 
Macrory, Ed. Reflections on 30 Years of EU Environmental Law (2006) at p.17.   
4 Art.174(1) EC Treaty.  
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principle.5  Most naturally, the principles seem to envisage situations where a 
contaminant is to be transmitted into the environmental media, of water, air or 
land, and some kind of pollution impact needs to be addressed.6  Where the 
objective of securing sustainable utilisation of a natural resource is at issue, 
however, the scope for application of the principles is less clear.  Indeed, the 
language of ‘protection’ of a resource which is actually exploited seems 
inherently contradictory.  Certainly, the objective for natural resources 
suggests that a distinction should be drawn between sustainable exploitation 
and unsustainable overexploitation, but how the environmental action 
principles assist in drawing this distinction is obscure.   
 
The problem is particularly acute where it is suggested that a ‘precautionary’ 
approach should be taken to the conservation of a natural resource.  The 
most commonly cited international definition of the precautionary principle is 
that stated as Principle 15 in the Rio Declaration of 1992.7  This states that 
the principle is be applied by states according to their capabilities so that 
“where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation”.  At the Community level, 
essentially this conception of the principle has been endorsed by a 
Commission Communication8 that seeks to articulate the circumstances in 
which precautionary action is justified.  This specifies that such action should 
be proportionate, non-discriminatory, consistent, and subject to cost-benefit 
analysis and periodic review.   
 
The meaning of ‘scientific uncertainty’ within the principle seems open-ended, 
but typically has been seen as relevant to situations where a new activity or 
product is at issue, where the environmental impacts of scientific or technical 
innovation are unknown but there is some evidence of the potential for harm.  
Paradigm examples are in applications of biotechnology or the marketing of a 
new chemical, where the environmental and human health impacts are 
unknown but potentially serious.9  Accordingly, Community legislation reflects 
the need for precaution in these circumstances by the application of 
appropriate kinds of risk assessment as a precursor to authorisation.10  
Where, however, an activity is not the result of any radical scientific or 
technical innovation and does not involve the transmission of a new kind of 
                                            
5 Art.174(2) EC Treaty.  To this list, might also be added the ‘rectification at source principle’, 
though this might alternatively be seen as an aspect of prevention which is of particular 
relevance to ‘end of pipe’ discharges of polluting substances.   
6 The role of the action principles in addressing pollution-related environmental problems was 
clearly an influential factor in the early development of the principles: see L. Kramer, ‘The 
Genesis of EC Environmental Principles’, in R. Macrory, Ed., Principles of European 
Environmental Law (2004).   
7 The text of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26) is 
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.   
8 European Commission, on the precautionary principle, COM(2000) 1.  
9 See, for example, N. de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles (2002) at ss.2.2.3.1 and 2.2.3.2 
and R. Lee, ‘(Pre)cautionary Tales: Risk, Regulation and the Precautionary Principle’ in J. 
Boswell and R. Lee, Eds., Economics Ethics & the Environment (2002) at p.87.   
10 See, for examples, Directive 2001/18/EC 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the 
environment of genetically modified organisms and Reg.1907/2006 concerning the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH).   
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substance into the environment, the scope for application of precaution is less 
clear.  Perhaps because of this uncertainty, there was significant early 
opposition to the application of the precautionary principle beyond pollution-
control contexts.11  On that view, action, if needed, should be based upon the 
need for prevention of environmental harm, rather than precaution.   
 
The boundaries between preventative and precautionary action, under the 
environmental action principles, may be broadly drawn between those 
situations where the character and extent of an impact is known and must be 
prevented, and situations where the impact is unknown but there is a threat of 
damage and precautionary action is needed.  In essence, precaution is 
required in the face of scientific uncertainty.  However, scientific uncertainty 
comes in many different forms12 and there is an increasing willingness to 
broaden the kinds of uncertainty in relation to which the precautionary 
principle should apply.13  
 
Where harvesting of a natural resource is at issue, the harm of 
overexploitation is generally well appreciated, but the point at which 
exploitation becomes overexploitation is a matter of considerable scientific 
uncertainty.  The uncertainty is not so much about the character of the impact 
involved as the extent of that impact and the point at which it constitutes 
environmental ‘damage’.  Determining this requires an assessment of the 
abundance of the harvested species, the capacity of that species for 
replenishment and the effects of the harvesting activity upon the harvested 
species and the wider ecosystem of which it forms a part.  Removal of one 
species from an ecosystem in significant numbers is capable of having 
serious effects upon the balance of that ecosystem, particularly the 
interrelations between predator and prey species, and the activity of 
harvesting itself is capable of damaging the ecosystem by impacts upon non-
target species.  The situation is compounded by the uncertainties that arise 
due to surrounding natural and anthropogenic factors.  Any wild species may 
                                            
11 See G. J. Hewison, ‘The Precationary Approach to Fisheries Management: An 
Environmental Perspective’ (1996) 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 301, 
where it is noted that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations argued (in 
1992) that the practical application of precaution “raises serious socio-economic concerns 
and technical difficulties, particularly in the complex marine ecosystems” (at p.308) and the 
European Community maintained (in 1993) that precautionary approaches should be limited 
to addressing ocean pollution (at p.310).  Although these antithetical views were eventually 
subsumed (in 1994) under a consensus on the general need for a ‘precautionary approach’ to 
high seas fisheries, as a precursor to the agreement of the United Nations Straddling Stocks 
Agreement (see section 8 below on this Agreement) uncertainties remain as to precisely what 
the ‘precautionary approach’ entails in this context.  The case for extending the application of 
the precautionary principle beyond marine pollution control contexts is made by J. S. Gray 
and J. M. Brewers, ‘Towards a Scientific Definition of the Precautionary Principle’ (1996) 32 
Marine Pollution Bulletin 768.  An early discussion of the implications of the precautionary 
principle for biodiversity conservation is N. Myers, ‘Biodiversity and the Precautionary 
Principle’ (1993) 22 AMBIO 74, which stressed the significance of uncertainty in this context 
and the role of irreversibility in relation to mass extinctions of species.   
12 R. Lee, ‘(Pre)cautionary Tales: Risk, Regulation and the Precautionary Principle’ in J. 
Boswell and R. Lee, Eds., Economics Ethics & the Environment (2002) p.87, at p.90.   
13 E. R. Stokes, ‘Liberalising the Threshold of Precaution – Cockle Fishing, the Habitats 
Directive, and Evidence of a New Understanding of Scientific Uncertainty’ [2005] 
Environmental Law Review 206, at p.210.   
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demonstrate unpredictable and dynamic population fluctuations due to natural 
factors such as disease, or favourable, or unfavourable, environmental 
conditions in particular years.  Replenishment of a population may also be 
greatly influenced by human impacts such as pollution and habitat 
deterioration arising from activities other than harvesting.   
 
Because of these factors, in the context of fishery science at least, it has been 
suggested that lack of predictability is endemic, to the extent that no amount 
of scientific research will ever resolve the kinds of uncertainty that have been 
referred to.14  If this is correct, the problem goes beyond that of uncertainty 
into that the realm of indeterminacy, where the answers are not only unknown 
but are incapable of being known with any amount of scientific endeavour.  
The difference between what is unknown and unknowable in science is an 
absorbing issue, with potentially wide-ranging implications for nature 
conservation and natural resource management generally, but need not be 
dwelt upon here.  The point is sufficiently made that harvesting of natural 
resources involves ample scientific uncertainty to justify a precautionary, 
rather than preventative, approach.   
 
Recognising that scientific uncertainty may activate the need for precaution in 
the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, a major difficulty in 
applying this arises because of the tension between precaution and the need 
for environmental action to be based upon scientific information.  Whilst the 
Community Environment Policy requires account to be taken of ‘available 
scientific and technical data’,15 the absence of such information should not be 
a reason for postponing precautionary action.  The clash of these two 
considerations seems capable of collapsing the distinction between 
prevention and precaution, and to provide a basis for either action or inaction 
where scientific information about a potential environmental problem is 
inadequate.  Given the uncertainties that have been referred to, information 
deficit is likely to be the norm rather than the exception where the 
management of natural resources is at issue.  A key difficulty, therefore, is 
whether precaution or scientific information should prevail as a basis for 
decision-making.   
 
In essence, these are the theoretical issues to be investigated in this paper.  
The focus is upon the objective of ‘prudent and rational utilisation of natural 
resources’, in accordance with the need to apply the ‘precautionary principle’ 
and the need to take account of ‘available scientific and technical data’.  As 
will be appreciated, the interrelation of these three elements involves some 
especially problematic tensions and ambiguities in the specific context of 
natural resource management that is taken for consideration.   
 
3. The Integration of Environmental Policy 
                                            
14 D. S. Butterworth ‘Taking stock: science and fisheries management entering the new 
millennium, Inaugural lecture, University of Cape Town (1999) discussed by S. M. Garcia, 
‘The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries 1995-2000: Progress Review and Main Issues’, 
Appendix to ICES Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management Report ICES 
CM2000/ACFM:17, at p.40,  available at www.ices.dk/reports/acfm/2000/cwp/cwp00.pdf.   
15 Art.174(3) EC Treaty.  
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If the greatest achievement of the Community in relation to the environment is 
the establishment of an explicit Environment Policy, a close running second 
greatest achievement must be the recognition that environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated across sectoral Community policies and 
activities with a view to promoting sustainable development.16  The irrational 
converse of this would an acceptance that environmental legislation could be 
compromised or nullified by harms inflicted under sectoral legislation.  Again, 
whilst integration has to be seen as vitally important, the integration obligation 
may be perceived as having more direct implications for some sectors of 
activity than others.  Given the most natural application of the environmental 
action principles to situations where pollution impacts are at issue, the precise 
meaning of the ‘environmental protection requirements’ that need to be 
integrated outside pollution control contexts is far from clear.  Moreover, the 
wide discretion afforded to Community institutions in interpreting and applying 
the integration requirement has the consequence that its legal enforceability is 
doubtful.  As with challenges to Community actions on the basis of failure to 
adhere to the Environment Policy, it is likely that failure to have regard to the 
integration requirement could only provide a basis for review if a ‘manifest 
error of appraisal’ could be shown in respect of its application or non-
application.17  The upshot of this is that the scope for judicial challenge to an 
alleged failure to apply the integration requirement in non-environmental 
sectors is extremely limited,18 and there is little scope for the European Court 
of Justice to offer insights into the precise meaning and scope of the 
integration obligation.   
 
Despite past calls for greater efforts in respect of implementation, progress 
seems to have been patchy and uncertain, perhaps reflecting the relative 
difficulties of incorporating environmental concerns in some sectors.  The 
Commission communication, Partnership for Integration,19 provided general 
guidelines for integration as a basis for the ‘Cardiff Process’ which has 
involved sectoral Councils formulating their own implementation strategies 
and obligations to monitor progress on implementation.20  However, concerns 
have been expressed that the impact of the Process may have been limited or 
                                            
16 Art.6 EC Treaty.  The sectoral policies at issue are listed in Art.3(1) and encompass, under 
(e), the Community’s Common Policy in the sphere of agriculture and fisheries.   
17 Case C-341/95 Bettati v Saftey Hi-Tech [1998] ECR-I 4355; N. Dhondt, Integration of 
Environmental Protection into other EC Policies (2003) at p.165; and see the literature on 
justiciability of the environmental principles cited in footnote 3 above.   
18 See D. Grimeaud, ‘The Integration of environmental Concerns into EC Policies: A Genuine 
Policy Development (2000) European Environmental Law Review 207, at p.215.   
19 European Commission, Partnership for integration – a strategy for integrating environment 
into EU policies, COM(98) 333.   
20 See L. Kramer, ‘The Genesis of EC Environmental Principles’, in R. Macrory, Ed., 
Principles of European Environmental Law (2004) at p.37.   
In the context of integration of environmental requirements in the fisheries sector, it has been 
suggested that progress has lagged behind other sectors, House of Lords Select Committee 
on the European Union, Unsustainable Fishing: What is to be done with the Common 
Fisheries Policy? (2000) Third Report Session 2000-01, HL13, para.88.  Subsequently, see 
European Commission, Elements of a Strategy for the Integration of Environmental Protection 
Requirements into the Common Fisheries Policy, COM(2001) 143 final, which served as a 
basis for aspects of the 2002 reform of the CFP (discussed at section 9 below). 
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illusory.  This has been attributed to unwillingness, on the part of the 
European Council, to embrace an explicit means of implementing 
environmental integration on the basis of specific timetables and indicators.21   
 
Any attempt to assess the substantial effects of the implementation 
requirement must involve looking at particular non-environmental sectors and 
making an evaluation of the extent to which Environmental Policy has actually 
been assimilated in those sectors.  A good example of a study of this kind 
evaluates the integration of Environment Policy into the Common Agricultural 
Policy, the Common Transport Policy and the EC Energy Policy.22  However, 
the literature on integration of Environmental Policy into other areas, 
particularly where natural resource management is involved, is apparently 
less well developed.  Hence, a further purpose of this paper is to review the 
progress of integration into a sector that is outside those that have been the 
subject of detailed scrutiny from this perspective.   
 
4. Environmental Management of Living Natural Resources 
 
The particular area of natural resources management that is taken for 
consideration is the management of marine fisheries in Community waters.  
Fish are clearly an important food resource for the Community, but fishery 
activities have the potential to cause serious ecological harm, in respect of the 
overexploitation of targeted fish stocks, impacts upon non-target species and 
in respect of harms to the wider marine environment.  The focus of attention 
must, therefore, be placed upon the extent to which integration of 
environmental requirements into Community fishery policy and regulation has 
enabled exploitation activities to be contained within acceptable ecological 
limits.   
 
The integration of environmental requirements into the Community’s Common 
Fisheries Policy has been particularly problematic.  Arguably, this is because 
the management of fisheries stands significantly apart from other sectors of 
activity in which environmental requirements need to be incorporated.  The 
activity of fishing needs to be regulated, not so much because of its pollution 
impacts, but because of the ecological damage that it inflicts upon targeted 
fish stocks and the marine environment.  Beyond that, integration may have 
been problematic because of the need for regulation to ensure the proper 
management of stocks of a wild and renewable living resource and the 
curtailment of ecological impacts of fishery activities within acceptable limits.  
The term ‘management’ used here stresses the longstanding, historically 
benign and beneficial nature of fishing activity, but the increasing potential for 
that activity to be conducted in a manner that is ecologically unacceptable if 
not restrained within specified limits.   
                                            
21 See D. Grimeaud, ‘The Integration of environmental Concerns into EC Policies: A Genuine 
Policy Development’ (2000) European Environmental Law Review 207.   
22 N. Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection into other EC Policies (2003).  See also, 
V. Heyvaert, ‘Guidance Without Constraint: Assessing the Impact of the Precautionary 
Principle on the European Community’s Chemicals Policy’ (2006) 6 Yearbook of European 
Environmental Law 27, which examines the sectoral impact of a particular environmental 
action principle.   
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The need for management of an activity involving the harvesting of a wild and 
renewable living natural resource sets fishery regulation apart from industrial 
environmental regulation, and even the regulation of most kinds of agriculture 
that fall under the Community’s Common Agriculture Policy.  The peculiar 
status of fisheries, therefore, illustrates marked contrasts with other 
resources, activities and environmental impacts to which environment 
requirements need to be applied.  As has been noted, the language of the 
Environment Policy, which aims at a “high level of protection”, seems 
particularly inappropriate where proper levels of exploitation rather than 
protection are at issue, as in fishing.  Hence, ecological objectives for 
harvested living resources are particularly difficult to formulate and apply 
compared to environmental quality objectives relating to the contamination of 
the environmental media of.  In addition, the absence of property rights in wild 
fish and the need for the Community to manage fishery exploitation within 
most of its marine waters in a co-ordinated and sustainable manner, raise 
issues which lack clear counterparts in other sectors.  Perhaps for these 
reasons, amongst others, the failures of the Community effectively to address 
the ecological challenges inherent in fishery management may be seen as an 
extreme case of sectoral environmental mismanagement.23   
 
5. The Initial Problems of the CFP 
 
To some extent, the lack of success that the Community has experienced in 
managing its fishery resources in an ecologically sound manner is due to the 
continuing under-application of regulatory powers over a many years.  In other 
respects, the failings of the CFP can be traced back to constitutional problems 
that have been present since the commencement of the Policy.24  In respect 
of the latter, the need for Community coordination of fisheries activities was 
recognised in the establishment of the CFP in 1983.25  Since its inception, the 
policy has been beset by the ambiguities and interrelationships of its 
objectives and the means of achieving these.   
 
The foundations of the policy, which lie in the Agriculture Title of the EC 
Treaty,26 have involved an agricultural production model being incongruously 
imposed upon fishery activities.  The objectives of the Common Agriculture 
Policy are stated to encompass:  
increasing agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and 
by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the 
                                            
23 It is beyond the scope of this paper draw comparisons with the environmental damage 
resulting from the Community’s Common Agriculture Policy, which must also be a strong 
contender for this dubious distinction. 
24 For discussion of the origins and early development of the CFP see M. Wise, The Common 
Fisheries Policy of the European Community (1984); J. Farnell and J. Elles, In Search of a 
Common Fisheries Policy (1984); R. R. Churchill, EEC Fisheries Law (1987); and M. Holden, 
The Common Fisheries Policy (1994).   
25 The first Basic CFP Regulation establishing the CFP and setting its objectives was 
Reg.170/83 though earlier provision had been made under Reg.2141/70 laying down a 
common structural policy for the fishing industry. 
26 Arts.32 to 38 EC Treaty, previously Arts.38 to 46.  The Treaty contains no article 
specifically concerned with fisheries.   
 9 
optimum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour; 
ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community; 
stabilisation of markets; assuring the availability of supplies; and 
ensuring that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.27   
These objectives seem significantly more appropriate to cultivation rather than 
harvesting activities,28 since the availability of the harvested product is subject 
to natural population dynamics and environmental variations that may be 
largely outside human control.  Put another way, providing Community 
support for the production of a greater quantity of a desired agricultural crop 
may well be a means of increasing the yield of that crop where that yield is 
primarily determined by farming effort and expertise.  However, it is far from 
clear that putting more resources into the gathering of a naturally occurring 
resource will necessary result in an increase in the yield.  It is even less likely 
that an increased yield will be sustained where abundance of the resource is 
determined as much by nature as by human agency.  To some extent 
therefore, the constitutional problems of the CFP may be seen to arise from 
the Policy being founded in a model which fails to recognise the distinctive 
dependency of fisheries upon ecological factors to an extent that is not found 
in agricultural activities.   
 
In addition, the imposition of an agriculture model upon fisheries is 
problematic because of the prominent role of social and economic factors 
such as the need to secure a fair standard of living for those engaged in the 
activity and to ensure that fishery products are available to consumers at fair 
prices.  In the context of the CFP the respective roles of the ecological, social 
and economic dimensions of the Policy have never been satisfactorily 
articulated.  This ambiguity has allowed excessive ecological harm to be 
inflicted where social and economic benefits of overfishing have been 
regarded as justifying this.29  The need to reconcile the three dimensions may 
be seen as illustrative of the more general balancing exercise inherent in the 
advancement of sustainable development.30  Nonetheless, the lack of 
specificity, as to the respective weight to be given to the different elements in 
the CFP, ‘which sometimes may seem contradictory or incompatible’31 has 
had serious ecological consequences.  Over many years, priority has 
effectively been given to economic and social conditions considerations, 
                                            
27 Art.33(1) EC Treaty.   
28 House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Review of the Common 
Fisheries Policy, (1992) 2nd Report, Session 1992-93, HL Paper 9, para.39 and House of 
Commons, Agriculture Committee, The Effects of Conservation measures on the UK Sea 
Fishing Industry, (1993) 6th Report, Session 1992-93, HC 620, para.6.   
29 See the discussion of this at section 11 below.   
30 See Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (2002) para.5, which identifies 
the ‘interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars’ of sustainable development as ‘economic 
development, social development and environmental protection’, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POI_PD.htm.  On the 
implications of the ‘three-pronged’ approach to sustainable development, see A Ross-
Robertson, ‘Is the Environment Getting Squeezed Out of Sustainable Development?’ [2003] 
Public Law 249.  There is a vast literature on sustainable development, but a good recent 
introduction to the issues is J. Holder and M. Lee, Environmental Protection, Law and Policy: 
Text and Materials (2007 2nd Ed.) Ch.6.   
31 European Commission, Green Paper, The future of the common fisheries policy 
COM(2001) 135 final, at p.6.   
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because of the need to minimise economic disruption for fishing communities, 
with conservation of marine resources being allocated a ‘secondary’ status.32   
 
Despite these constitutional difficulties and ambiguities in its objectives, the 
CFP provided the basis for a complete transition of responsibility for fisheries 
from the member states to Community.33  However, a peculiarity of the CFP is 
the division between regulatory and enforcement responsibilities.  Whilst 
regulation is undertaken at a Community level, it is left to member states to 
ensure the enforcement of this legislation within their jurisdictions.  Although 
the discretion given to member states with regard to enforcement might be 
seen as a desirable element of subsidiarity,34 the absence of competence of 
the Commission on enforcement might equally be seen as an inherent defect 
in the system of control.35  Certainly, the initial experience of the CFP 
demonstrated ‘a catalogue of failings’ in relation to enforcement matters, with 
apparently little attempt by some member states to ensure adequate fishery 
surveillance.36  Hopefully, the longstanding difficulties arising from the division 
of competences between the Community and the member states will be 
addressed by the establishment of the European Union Fisheries Control 
Agency, which, from the 1 January 2007, has had the task of strengthening 
inspection and control of fisheries measures and coordinating the 
enforcement activities of member states to secure greater uniformity.37  Whilst 
it is not possible to pursue these issues in detail here, it must be noted that 
the context of longstanding inadequacies in monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms has significant implications for the practical operation of the 
CFP.   
 
6. The Continuing Problems of the CFP 
 
Since 1983, over its initial two decades at least, the CFP has been widely 
regarded by commentators as a failure in all its ecological, social and 
                                            
32 House of Commons, Agriculture Committee, The Effects of Conservation measures on the 
UK Sea Fishing Industry, (1993) 6th Report, Session 1992-93, HC 620 (1993) para.35.   
33 Confirmed by a Declaration of the Commission, 27 July 1981, OJ C 224 p.1, 3 September 
1981, which states that the competence to adopt measures relating to the conservation of the 
resources of the sea belongs ‘fully and definitively’ to the Community.  See also Commission 
v United Kingdom, Case 804/79 [1981] ECR 1279 at para.17.   
34 Under Art.5 EC Treaty.   
35 See M. Holden, The Common Fisheries Policy (1994) p.159.   
36 House of Commons Agriculture Committee, , The Effects of Conservation Measures on the 
UK Sea Fishing Industry, 6th Report, Session 1992-93, HC 620 (1993) para.99 and see 
European Commission, Report on monitoring implementation of the Common Fisheries 
Policy, SEC(92) 394 final.  For a more recent illustration of the continuing failure to enforce 
CFP regulations see Case C-304/02 Commission v France and discussion of this by A. 
Schrauwen, ‘Fishery, Waste Management and Persistent and General Failure to Fulfil Control 
Obligations’ [2006] Journal of Environmental Law 289.   
37 See European Commission, Press Release 30 October 2006, EU Fisheries Control Agency 
adopts first work programme for 2007.  See Reg.768/2005 establishing a Community 
Fisheries Control Agency and amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 establishing a control 
system applicable to the common fisheries policy.  On the new arrangements for enforcement 
more generally, see House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Community, 
Progress of Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, 25th Report Session 2002-03, HL Paper 
109 (2003) paras.36 to 44.   
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economic dimensions.38  Indeed, it might not be too cynical to regard it as a 
classic case study in how not to progress towards sustainable development.  
From an ecological perspective, the application of the policy has facilitated the 
excessive exploitation of fish stocks to the point where the most commercially 
valuable stocks have reached dangerously low levels.39  As the Commission 
itself has acknowledged, 
‘many stocks are at present [in 2001] outside safe biological limits. 
They are too heavily exploited or have low quantities of mature fish or 
both.  The situation is particularly serious for demersal fish stocks such 
as cod, hake and whiting.  If current trends continue, many stocks will 
collapse.  At the same time the available fishing capacity of the 
Community fleets far exceeds that required to harvest fish in a 
sustainable manner.’40   
The catastrophic state of fisheries has since been confirmed by the European 
Environment Agency, in stating that, of the assessed commercial fish stocks 
in the north-east Atlantic, up to 53% are now considered to be outside safe 
biological limits.41   
 
Intensification of fishing activities has also brought about major destruction of 
non-target marine species and unacceptable ecosystem damage.  This is due 
to the high proportion of undesired or undersized species that are captured in 
mixed species fisheries, and ‘discarded’,42 usually dead, back into the sea.  
Also, many species of mammals and birds are destroyed by fishing activities 
or by entanglement in nets that have been lost or abandoned but continue to 
destroy wildlife in ‘ghost’ fishing.  At a national level, the position was 
admirably summarised by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
in the observation that the impact of fishing on the marine environment as ‘the 
greatest individual threat to that environment in the seas around the UK’.43   
 
Moreover, the excessively destructive levels of fishing activity allowed under 
the CFP has not brought the economic or social benefits that were envisaged, 
with over-capitalisation and diminishing returns giving rise to ‘economic 
                                            
38 See Y-H. Song, ‘The EC’s Common Fisheries Policy in the 1990s’ (1995) 26 
Ocean Development and International Law 31; T. S. Gray, ‘The Tragedy of the 
Common Fisheries Policy: UK Fisheries Policy in the 1990s’, in T. S. Grey, Ed., UK 
Environmental Policy in the 1990s (1995) p.263; and C. Coffey, ‘Introduction to the 
Common Fisheries Policy: an Environmental Perspective’ [1996] International 
Environmental Affairs 287.  
39 See Council Decision No.97/413/EC of 26 June 1997, concerning the objectives and 
detailed rules for restructuring the Common fisheries sector for period from 1 January 1997 to 
31 December 2001 with a view to achieving a balance on a sustainable basis between 
resources and their exploitation, which classifies the state of fish stocks under four categories, 
‘under-exploited’, ‘fully exploited’, ‘over-exploited’ and ‘depleted (since amended by Council 
Decision 2002/70/EC).   
40 European Commission, Green Paper, The future of the common fisheries policy 
COM(2001) 135 final, at p.4.   
41 European Environment Agency, The European Environment - State and Outlook (2005) 
p.380.   
42 For a recent discussion of the means of addressing these problems see European 
Commission, A policy to reduce unwanted by-catches and eliminate discards in European 
Fisheries, COM(2007) 136 final.   
43 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Turning the tide: addressing the impact of 
fisheries on the marine environment, 25th Report, Cm 6392 (2004) para.1.9.   
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fragility’ in the fishery sector.  This situation is accepted to be the result of 
over-investment, rapidly rising costs and a shrinking resource base, with the 
consequences of poor profitability and declining employment.44   
 
7. The Regulatory Approaches 
 
In short, the central problem of the CFP may be seen as that of allowing too 
many boats to exploit too few fish with too few restrictions upon their 
activities.45  This has set the Policy upon a ‘downward spiral’ involving 
increasingly intensified fishing activities, facilitated by enormous technical 
development of fishing fleets, to expend increased fishery capacity in 
capturing an increasing proportion of a dangerously diminishing natural 
resource.  If any social and economic gains have been secured by allowing 
this progression, they are short-term benefits that have been made at 
unacceptable ecological expense.   
 
If this crude characterisation of the problem is sufficient at least to serve as a 
working hypothesis, attention must be turned to the regulatory response.  On 
this, the complexity of Community fishery law needs no announcement: it is a 
field of law which is of bewildering intricacy and baffling technicality to all but 
specialists in the area.  Hence, it is necessary to offer some broad 
generalisations if any progress is to be made in the elaboration of the central 
issues that are taken up for discussion in this paper.   
 
In a nutshell, therefore, there are six main kinds of regulatory approaches that 
may be used to address the problem of overexploitation of Community fishery 
resources.  Broadly, these regulatory approaches involve: 
(1) restricting total allowable catches (TACs) of particular fish stocks;  
(2) reducing the capacity of the Community fishing fleet by decommissioning 
vessels;  
(3) reducing fishing effort by restricting the duration of fishing activities;  
(4) applying ‘technical’ conservation measures such as prohibiting kinds of 
fishing gear that are unacceptably destructive of fish stocks or the marine 
ecosystem;  
(5) restricting access to particular areas to allow stock recovery or ecological 
protection; and/or  
(6) introducing rules restricting the marketing of undersized or immature fish.46   
These six mechanisms, by which fishery activities can be brought into balance 
with stock replenishment, each have respective strengths and weaknesses, 
which it is not possible to consider in the detail that they deserve within the 
                                            
44 European Commission, Green Paper, The future of the common fisheries policy 
COM(2001) 135 final, at p.4.   
45 Compare, House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Review of the 
Common Fisheries Policy, (1992) 2nd Report, Session 1992-93, HL Paper 9, para.44: “there 
are quite simply too many boats chasing too few fish”.   
46 The potential oversimplification involved in this six-fold classification is fully recognised.  
Contrast Art.4(2) Basic CFP Reg. 2371/2002, which lists ten kinds of measures which may be 
established to achieve the objectives of the Policy.  Compare Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, Review of Marine Fisheries and Environmental Enforcement (The 
‘Bradley’ Report) (2004) Annex 7 para.A7.5, which classifies CFP regulations under seven 
enforcement areas.  
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scope of this paper.  Nonetheless, each of the mechanisms has a significant 
part to play in addressing the overall problem of overfishing, and the critical 
issues are about the balance which needs to be drawn between the 
respective uses of the different mechanisms.   
 
Although recognising the important contribution that can be made by each 
and all of the mechanisms in the regulatory ‘tool-box’,47 the discussion that 
follows places greatest emphasis upon the role of TACs in Community fishery 
management.  This is not intended to devalue the other approaches, but 
rather to emphasise that TACs may be seen as the keystone of fishery 
regulation in determining the quantities of commercial species of fish that may 
be harvested from Community waters within any particular year.  Overall 
TACs determine the maximum amounts of the most commercially important 
fish that may be taken by the national fleets of member states under their 
‘national quota allocation’.  Determination of TACs makes it possible to 
calculate the corresponding level of overall fishing effort that will ensure that 
the limit upon catch is not exceeded.  To some extent, therefore, the other 
mechanisms for regulating fishery activity may be seen as a means to the end 
of ensuring that TACs are not exceeded, hence the reason for the priority 
given to TACs in the discussion that follows.  In essence, a central problem of 
the CFP is the failure to establish and enforce TACs at a level which is 
stringent enough to ensure ecological sustainability of fishery resources.48   
 
The focus upon TACs as a central mechanism for attaining sustainable 
Community fisheries is not intended to suggest that they are a faultless 
means of achieving this objective.  TACs are a measure of the maximum 
permitted levels of landings of particular species of fish by the Community 
fleets, but not a measure of the actual level of fish mortality resulting from 
fishing activity or its overall ecological impact.  TACs do not reflect the 
massive quantities of fish that are discarded because they are undersized, not 
of a species or size desired by the fisher or because they are caught in 
excess of quota.  Moreover, TACs do not reflect misreported or illegally 
landed catches.  Perhaps most problematically, in the mixed-species fisheries 
commonly found in Community waters, fishing for a particular species X must 
cease where the national quota for that species has been met, but this will not 
necessarily prevent fishing for another species Y, even where species X 
continues to be caught as a bycatch.  The setting of TACs for individual 
species, therefore, is problematic in taking account of the interrelationships 
between species, particularly where a predator-prey relationship exists 
between them, or where different species have different capacities for 
replenishment, and in taking account of impacts upon the wider marine 
environment.49   
                                            
47 See House of Commons, Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Reform of the Common 
Fisheries Policy, 1st Report, Session 2002-03 (2002) para.27.   
48 Contrast, House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Community, Progress of 
Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, 25th Report Session 2002-03, HL Paper 109 (2003) 
para.28, where it is suggested that management based on effort control, rather than TACs, 
would be a preferable approach.   
49 The limitations of the TAC approach to fisheries management are well covered in House of 
Commons, Agriculture Committee, The Effects of Conservation Measures on the UK Sea 
Fishing Industry, (1993) 6th Report, Session 1992-93, HC 620 paras.40 and 43 and House of 
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Despite all these reservations, TACs have two redeeming features.  The first 
is their practical advantage as a means for determining national allocations of 
fish quota in a manner that is less controversial than any readily available 
alternative.  After lengthy and controversial debate, the initial legislation 
establishing the CFP established a mechanism for distributing proportions of 
the TACs for each species to the member states in a manner that allows each 
state ‘relative stability’ of fishing activities for each of the stocks concerned.50  
The use of TACs as the basis for an annual share-out of national quota allows 
member states to be assured of fishery opportunities that are seen to reflect 
relatively fixed proportions of an overall Community limit.51   
 
Secondly, and perhaps most pertinent here, TACs contrast with the other 
approaches to fishery regulation listed above insofar as they are a measure of 
fishery output rather than fishery input.  Restricting fishing methods, durations, 
areas etc. may serve to reduce the impacts of fishing activities, but do not 
necessarily guarantee this.  Area restrictions, for example, have the potential 
to simply displace fishery impacts from one stock to another, without any 
overall reduction in impact.  If the aim of securing sustainable exploitation is 
the overall objective of fishery management, then a measure of the 
acceptable level of exploitation needs to be specified as a mandatory 
requirement.  This is not to defend TACs against the criticisms that have been 
voiced, but to maintain their unavoidably important regulatory function.  
Neither is this any defence of the way in which the TACs system has operated 
in practice.52  Frequent misuse of TACs to allow excessive exploitation does 
not demonstrate their inadequacy as a fishery management mechanism, but 
merely that that mechanism has been misused in practice. 
 
8. The International Context 
 
The difficulties that have beset the European Community in setting and 
enforcing TACs at a level which secures the sustainable exploitation of fishery 
resources are not a unique feature in the seascape of international fisheries 
management.  The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
produces bi-annual surveys of the state of global fishery resources.  These 
surveys have shown a consistent downward trend in the proportion of marine 
fish stocks with potential for expanded production, coupled with an increase in 
the proportion classified as overexploited or depleted.  Only 3% of marine 
stocks are classified as underexploited, 20% are moderately exploited, 52% 
are fully exploited, which means they are being fished at their maximum 
biological productivity.  Increased fishing of these stocks would not produce 
any additional sustainable harvests and would reduce reproduction to 
                                                                                                                             
Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Review of the Common Fisheries 
Policy, (1992) 2nd Report, Session 1992-93, HL Paper 9, paras.48 to 52.   
50 Art.4(1) Basic CFP Reg.170/83.   
51 See House of Commons, Agriculture Committee, The Effects of Conservation Measures on 
the UK Sea Fishing Industry, (1993) 6th Report, Session 1992-93, HC 620 paras.40 to 53 and 
House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Review of the Common 
Fisheries Policy, (1992) 2nd Report, Session 1992-93, HL Paper 9, para.62.   
52 See section 11 below on the practical operation of TACs.   
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dangerously low levels.  The remaining 25% are classified as over exploited 
(17%) depleted (7%) or recovering from depletion (1%).53   
 
The global failure to manage fisheries sustainably may be seen as illustrative 
of Garret Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ hypothesis.54  This suggests that, 
in the absence of property rights in the resource or regulatory control, there is 
no incentive for restraint in the exploitation of common resources and ‘the 
inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy’.  This model 
seems particularly apposite to marine fisheries contexts, where the element of 
‘rivalry’ is present and the capture of fish by one fisher entails a lesser catch 
for others harvesting within the same waters.55  Hence,  
‘when many fishermen have access to the same fish stock, each has 
every reason to grab as large a share of the potential yield as possible 
lest the other fishermen reap all the benefit.  Prudent harvesting by one 
fisherman, in order to maintain the stocks, will mostly only benefit other 
more aggressive fishermen.  Thus, an individual fisherman’s best 
course of action is to try to grab his share as quickly as possible while 
the resource is large enough to yield some profit.  As a result, the 
fishery expands to an excessive level of fishing effort, leading to 
reduced or even collapsed fish stocks, and little or not net economic 
benefit.56   
In addition, fisheries illustrate an international dimension to the hypothesis 
insofar as fishing states may be unwilling to take the lead on fisheries 
conservation if this is seen to benefit other states, with the result that 
international legislation is destined to reflect the lowest common denominator 
so far as conservation is concerned.57  In the past, it has been observed that 
‘the concept of the ‘global commons’ and its abuse is nowhere better 
illustrated than by European Community fisheries policy’.58  The statistical 
                                            
53 FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2006 (2007) at http://www.fao.org.  
Contrast C. Clover, The End of the Line (2004) at p.34 to 35, which suggests that global 
fishery productivity is significantly less than FAO figures suggests due to greatly inflated 
misreporting.  For a discussion of the situation in the North Atlantic, see D. Pauly and J. 
Maclean, In A Perfect Ocean (2003) Ch.2.   
54 G. Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243.   
55 Indeed, precursors of Hardin’s seminal article on commons considered the issues 
specifically in the context of fishery exploitation.  See H. S. Gordon, ‘The Economic Theory of 
a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery’ (1954) 62 Journal of Political Economy 124 (on 
the divergence between individual and collective rationality in exploitation) and A. D. Scott, 
‘The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership’ (1955) 63 Journal of Political Economy 116 
(on the impacts of fishing in one period in reducing the stocks available for reproduction and 
fishing in later periods).  Generally, see D. Feeny, S. Hanna and A. F. McEvoy, ‘Questioning 
the Assumptions of the “Tragedy of the Commons” Model of Fisheries’, (1996) 72 Land 
Economics 187.  The consequences of inappropriate incentives in fisheries can be traced 
back even further in the literature to 1911: see P. Anderson, ‘On rent of fishing grounds: a 
translation of Jens Warming’s 1911 article, with an introduction’ (1983) 15 History of Political 
Economy 391, discussed in H. Frost and P. Anderson, ‘The Common Fisheries Policy of the 
European Union and fisheries economics’ (2006) 30 Marine Policy 737 at p.738.   
56 House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Community, Progress of Reform of the 
Common Fisheries Policy, 25th Report Session 2002-03, HL Paper 109 (2003) para.55.   
57 T. Daw and T. Gray, ‘Fisheries Science and sustainability in international policy: a study of 
failure in the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy’ (2004) 29 Marine Policy 189, s.3.2.   
58 C. Coffey, ‘Introduction to the Common Fisheries Policy: An Environmental Perspective’ 
[1996] International Environmental Affairs p.227, at p.288. 
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information on fisheries provided by the FAO, however, suggests that this 
abuse is actually quite widespread.   
 
The role of international law in tackling the problem has, until fairly recently, 
been quite limited, but the implementation of measures adopted in the last few 
years carries considerable potential to address the over-exploitation of global 
fishery commons.59  The foundation of international fisheries regulation lies in 
the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982,60 which places emphasis on the need 
for ‘optimum utilization’ of living resources by coastal states and the need to 
maintain stocks at a level that will produce the ‘maximum sustainable yield’ for 
high seas fishery resources.61  To some extent, TACs under the CFP may be 
seen as a regional counterpart of these requirements.62  However, there are 
inherent difficulties with the formulation and application of the concept of 
‘maximum sustainable yield’ on the basis of the ‘best scientific evidence 
available’, particularly where information on fish stocks is inadequate or non-
existent.   
 
The global problem of unsustainable fishery management reflects these 
difficulties, particularly when read alongside the general freedom of high seas 
fishing, affirmed in the Convention.63  Moreover, the duty to ensure maximum 
sustainable yields is not tempered by any explicit requirement to have regard 
to precaution in determining those yields.  Whilst conservation measures are 
provided for,64 these should be based upon the ‘best scientific evidence 
available’ to the states concerned, to maintain or restore populations of 
harvested species to levels which can produce the maximum sustainable 
yield.  This suggests a close relationship between conservation measures and 
scientific information, but is uninformative as to what is required where that 
information is deficient.65  Given the uncertainties involved, it has been 
suggested that, to meet the long-term objective of maintaining fish populations 
at the desired level,  
‘it will usually be necessary to limit catches to considerably less that the 
theoretical maximum sustainable yield . . . A strategy aimed at a target 
yield substantially lower that the theoretical maximum may be better 
able to provide a reasonably constant level of yield with less risk of 
                                            
59 D. Nelson, ‘The Development of the Legal Regime of High Seas Fisheries’ and D. 
Freestone, ‘International Fisheries Law Since Rio: The Continued Rise of the Precautionary 
Principle’, in A. Boyle and D. Freestone, Eds., International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (1999) at pp.135 and 165 
respectively.   
60 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, hereafter ‘UNCLOS’, is available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm.   
61 Arts.62 and 119 UNCLOS.   
62 Although the limitations of this comparison are evident from European Commission, 
Implementing sustainability in EU fisheries through maximum sustainable yield, SEC(2006) 
868, which acknowledges that the use of TACs and other kinds of fishery measures has failed 
to maintain Community fishery exploitation with maximum sustainable yields.    
63 Art.116 UNCLOS.   
64 Arts.61 and 118 UNCLOS.   
65 S. M. Garcia, ‘The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fishery Management’ 
(1994) 22 Ocean & Coastal Management 99, at p.105 and G. J. Hewitson, ‘The Precautionary 
Approach to Fisheries Management: An Environmental Perspective’ [1996] International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 301, at p.321.   
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collapse, less demanding requirements for monitoring of stock level, 
lower unit costs of fishing and less disturbance to the environment.’66   
 
A debate on the extent to which the Law of the Sea Convention allows a 
precautionary approach to fishery management, and whether the principle has 
attained the status of customary international law, reached a climax in the 
deliberations leading up to the adoption of the United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement of 1995.67  Curiously, the Fish Stocks Agreement, has done little 
explicitly to resolve the dispute because it introduces some important 
precautionary approaches to fisheries management whilst, at the same time, 
affirming that it not intended to prejudice anything under the Law of the Sea 
Convention (which does not seem to envisage the application of precaution to 
fisheries management).68   
 
Despite the ambiguities that lie at its foundations, the Fish Stocks Agreement 
has introduced major innovations in respect of the need for precautionary 
conservation measures in respect of fish stocks that migrate between different 
jurisdictions.  In turn, the need to secure sustainable fisheries which underlies 
this measure has influenced changes of approach in the CFP.  Most notably, 
the Fish Stocks Agreement advocates the use of management strategies that 
aim to maintain or restore populations of harvested ‘straddling’ stocks at 
levels consistent with a precautionary approach.  This involves the use of 
‘conservation or limit reference points’ which, if exceeded, activate prompt 
conservation and management action, and ‘target reference points’ requiring 
more general management strategies to ensure that these are not generally 
exceeded.69   
 
Alongside the Fish Stocks Agreement, the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
of the United Nations has been active in securing international agreements on 
various non-mandatory measures which support progress towards greater 
sustainability in fisheries management.70  Most significantly the Organization 
has produced a non-mandatory Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries71 
and a detailed set of guidelines for implementing a precautionary approach to 
                                            
66 J. Cooke and M. Earle, ‘Towards a Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management’ 
(1993) RECIEL 252, at p.255, emphasis added.   
67 Agreement on the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (1995) A/CONF.164/37, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm.  Hereafter referred to as the ‘Fish Stocks Agreement’.   
68 Art.4 Fish Stocks Agreement states that “nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the 
rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the [Law of the Sea] Convention.  This 
Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of an in a manner consistent with 
the provisions of the Convention.”   
69 Art.6 and Annex II Fish Stocks Agreement.   
70 See, FAO, Fisheries, (author, B. Kuemlangan) Chapter 7 in Law and Sustainable 
Development Since Rio: Legal Trends in Agriculture and Natural Resource Management 
(2002) (FAO Legislative Study 73) for a discussion of various FAO initiatives in relation to 
fisheries management.   
71 The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995) is available at 
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm.   
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fisheries management,72 which again heavily emphasises the need for 
management action to be determined by biological reference points.   
 
The international evolution of a consensus that a precautionary approach to 
fisheries management requires the formulation of precautionary reference 
points to be established, to activate management action, has also been 
influential upon the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 
in formulating its fisheries advice to the Community in terms of ‘safe biological 
limits’ for stocks.  ICES is an intergovernmental organisation that coordinates 
scientific advice on fisheries management in the Northeast Atlantic.  The 
Organisation was founded in 190273 and has developed expertise and 
procedures for providing advice to governments and the European 
Community about fish stocks in the region.  Although this advice is not legally 
binding on governments, the high reputation of ICES for scientific excellence 
and neutrality has the consequence that this advice must be given 
considerable weight in fishery management decision-making.   
 
Notably, ICES has been active in the scientific development of biological 
reference points and has developed forms for advice that are consistent with 
the precautionary approach to fisheries elaborated under the global fisheries 
regimes.  Under this framework, advice is based on an estimate of current 
stock status and usually sets out catch options that should maintain the stock 
status within ‘safe biological limits’.  This term refers to the level of the 
spawning stock below which there is an unacceptable probability that 
recruitment will be impaired.  From this, a precautionary management strategy 
is determined by adding a buffer which generates a very low probability of 
reaching a stock level at which recruitment will be impaired.  The magnitude 
of the buffer depends on the natural variability of the stock, the precision of 
the assessment, and the risk that the management agencies are willing to 
accept.  The methodology for biological reference points seeks to articulate 
and specify the level of acceptable impairment risk, which for most stocks is 
set as low as 5%.74   
 
These developments must also be seen against a background of the broad 
but important commitments to sustainable development of fisheries made at 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.  
Under Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, new approaches to marine and coastal 
management are required that are precautionary and anticipatory in ambit.  
The parties commit themselves to integrated management and sustainable 
development of the marine environment; to the conservation and sustainable 
                                            
72 FAO, Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries and Species Introductions (1996) (FAO 
Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries 2).   
73 Under the Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, amended 
in 1964, available at http://www.ices.dk/aboutus/convention.asp.   
74 See O.S Stokke and C. Coffey, ‘Precaution, ICES and the common fisheries policy: a study 
of regime interplay’ (2004) 28 Marine Policy 117, at p.119.  The authors draw upon 
information provided in reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management.  
See particularly, H. Lassen and H. Sparholt, ICES Framework for the Implementation of the 
Precautionary Approach (2000) an appendix to ICES Advisory Committee on Fisheries 
Management Report ICES CM2000/ACFM:17 available at 
www.ices.dk/reports/acfm/2000/cwp/cwp00.pdf.   
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use of the marine living resources of the high seas; and to maintaining or 
restoring populations of marine species at levels that can produce the 
maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and 
economic factors, and taking into consideration relationships among 
species.75  The commitment to sustainable fisheries was reaffirmed at the 
Johannesburg Earth Summit in 2002 and was one of the few areas in which 
concrete environmental commitments were undertaken.76  Chapter IV the  
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, required action to ‘maintain or restore 
stocks to levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield with the aim 
of achieving these goals for depleted stocks on an urgent basis and where 
possible not later than 2015’.  Alongside this, more general exhortations were 
made for the encouragement of an ecosystem approach to the marine 
environment, to implement the FAO initiatives referred to above and to 
develop programmes to halt the loss of marine biodiversity.77   
 
9. The Reform of the CFP 
 
Given that the CFP was initially established for a 20-year period, it was 
necessary to establish a new basis for the policy at the end of 2002, and the 
international initiatives noted above were strongly influential in the reform 
process.  Following a 2001 Green Paper, The Future of the Common 
Fisheries Policy78 and a raft of communication documents on the need for 
reform of its component parts,79 new regulations for the ‘reformed’ policy were 
put in place from the end of 2002 onwards.  The major significance of these 
reforms reflects the seriousness of criticisms of previous operation of the CFP 
and the need for radical change.  As the Commission put it, 
‘the CFP has reached a turning point.  The challenges are urgent and 
serious.  The current poor sustainability performance of the CFP 
proves that many of the instruments applied over the last twenty years 
have reached their limits.  In this state of crisis there is a need for major 
change.  Reform of the objectives, principles, priorities and instruments 
of the CFP is more than ever necessary to deliver sustainable 
                                            
75 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, paras.17.1, 17.5(d) and 17.46(b).  Chapter 17 is concerned with 
the protection of the oceans, all kinds of seas, including enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, 
and coastal areas and the protection, rational use and development of their living resources.  
The text of Agenda 21 is available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm. 
76 See L. Rajamani, ‘From Stockholm to Johannesburg: The Anatomy of Dissonance in the 
International Environmental Dialogue’ (2003) 12 RECIEL 23, at p.31.   
77 See Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, Ch.IV, on ‘protecting and managing the natural 
resource base of economic and social development’, paras.31(a), 30(d), 31(c) and 32(d), 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm.   
78 European Commission, Green Paper, The future of the common fisheries policy 
COM(2001) 135 final.   
79 Most notable, in relation to the general conservation aspects of the CFP, are European 
Commission, On a Community Action Plan to reduce discards of fish, COM(2002) 656; 
Setting out a Community Action Plan to integrate environmental protection requirements in 
the Common Fisheries Policy, COM(2002) 186; and On the reform of the Common Fisheries 
Policy (the ‘Roadmap’ Communication) COM(2002) 181.   
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development and to ensure that the European fishing industry has a 
secure future.’80   
 
In legislative terms, the CFP has always hinged around a ‘Basic CFP 
Regulation’, which, following the 2002 reform, is now Reg.2371/2002.81  This 
sets out the objectives of the reformed Policy and the range of regulatory 
measures that may be adopted in furtherance of that policy.  The present 
Regulation states that the CFP ‘shall ensure exploitation of living aquatic 
resources that provides sustainable economic, environmental and social 
conditions’.  For that purpose, the Community is bound to apply the 
precautionary approach in taking measures designed to protect and conserve 
living aquatic resources, to provide for their sustainable exploitation and to 
minimise the impact of fishing activities on marine eco-systems.  The policy 
must aim at a progressive implementation of an ecosystem-based approach 
to fisheries management.82  The policy must also aim to contribute to efficient 
fishing activities within an economically viable and competitive fishing 
industry, providing a fair standard of living for those who depend on fishing 
activities and taking into account the interests of consumers.83  It is notable 
that this latest statement of objectives incorporates the same balancing of 
environmental, social and economic aims that has always proved problematic 
for the CFP.  However, the wording emphasises some new environmental 
management themes which suggest far-reaching changes of approach.  
Whilst the new wording is to be welcomed, the substantive effects of this, in 
securing sustainable management of Community fishery resources, need 
careful consideration.   
 
10. The Emphasis on Precautionary Approach 
 
The emphasis upon a precautionary approach to sustainable exploitation in 
the reformed CFP raises the issue of how precaution is to be interpreted and 
applied in this context.  As has been noted, the application of the principle to 
fisheries management has previously been controversial.  Not least 
problematic is the fact that the principle seems to envisage ‘damage’ of a kind 
which seems more relevant to pollution-control contexts than natural resource 
management.  The identification of what levels of ‘serious or irreversible’ 
impacts are sufficient to activate the need for precaution in the fisheries 
context has been a central topic of debate.   
 
Progressively, however, the circumstances and manner of application of 
precaution to fisheries have gathered a consensus, particularly in the light of 
the international influences.  The immediate harm at issue is not the extinction 
of any particular species, but rather the threat that stock levels will be 
                                            
80 European Commission, on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (the ‘Roadmap’ 
Communication) COM(2002) 181 final, at s.4, emphasis added.  For more trenchant criticism 
of the failings of the CFP see, WWF, Fishing Madness: 101 reasons why the CFP needs 
radical reform (2002).   
81 Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of 
fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy.   
82 See section 14 below on the ecosystem approach.   
83 Art.2(1) Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002.   
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depressed below a level at which recovery is significantly impaired.  
Precaution, in a fisheries management context, therefore, involves identifying 
this level of stocks in precise quantitative terms with appropriate allowance for 
the uncertainties involved.  It seems to be generally accepted that reduction in 
fishing pressure will eventually result in the restoration of depleted stocks, 
though this may take some time for some species.84  Nonetheless, the harm 
of serious stock depletion is ‘serious’, though probably not ‘irreversible’, as 
with other kinds of environmental impacts where precaution may be 
relevant.85  Precaution also involves consideration of the extent to which 
fishing activities need to be restricted to reduce impacts upon non-target 
species and to prevent damage to the wider marine environment.  These 
themes are explored through consideration of the way that the reformed CFP 
has sought to achieve greater sustainability in specification of total allowable 
catches and how it has provided for ‘emergency measures’ to be adopted for 
conservation reasons.   
 
11. The Criticisms of TAC Determinations 
 
One key area in which a precautionary approach will operate under the 
reformed CFP is in relation to determinations of TACs.  The theoretical 
difficulties with TACs have been noted,86 but attention must now be turned to 
the difficulties that have arisen in their practical operation.  Previously, annual 
TACs have been set for the most commercially important stocks of fish by the 
Fisheries Council, but it has often declined to follow scientific advice on fish 
stocks in making these determinations, with serious ecological consequences.  
The Council is bound to consider the independent scientific advice provided 
by the International Council for Exploration of the Sea, but also bound to 
consider the social and economic impacts of reducing catches upon those 
dependent upon the fishing industry.  A widely held view is that the Fisheries 
Council consistently failed in its task of balancing the different factors and ‘the 
annual pattern of decision-making has resulted in a dilatory policy of stock 
management that has failed to safeguard or restore stocks’.87   
 
The reason for this failing was because Fisheries Council deliberations were 
strongly charged by political considerations.  As it has been put,  
                                            
84 See House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Community, Progress of Reform 
of the Common Fisheries Policy, 25th Report Session 2002-03, HL Paper 109 (2003) Box 7 
(The Canadian Experience) and para.77, and Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 
25th Report, Turning the Tide: Addressing the Impact of Fisheries on the Marine Environment 
(2004) Cm6392 para.5.43 and Box 5B on ‘Cod Collapse on Grand Banks’ (Newfoundland).   
85 Although concerns have also been addressed about the unknown effects of fishing upon 
the genetic variability of fish stocks reducing the long-term stability of ecosystems, see 
European Commission, Biodiversity Action Plan for Fisheries COM(2001) 162 and Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, 25th Report, Turning the Tide: Addressing the Impact 
of Fisheries on the Marine Environment (2004) Cm6392 para.5.58.   
86 See the discussion of TACs at section 7 above.   
87 European Commission, Application of the precautionary principle and multiannual 
arrangements for setting TACs, COM(2000) 803 final, at p.3.  Alongside this, it must be noted 
that fishers have a longstanding distrust for scientific information on fish stocks, see House of 
Commons, Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, 1st 
Report, Session 2002-03 (2002) para.19.   
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‘economic hardship and unemployment caused by [fishing] cut backs 
are high profile issues, eagerly reported by the press and easily 
blamed on the actions of a fisheries minister.  In contrast, the blame for 
hardship borne of resource over-exploitation is unlikely to fall as 
directly at the feet of a government when alternative scapegoats are 
available in the form of unsustainable practices of foreign fleets, 
mismanagement by previous governments or climatic variability’.88 
Hence, individual fishery ministers were placed under heavy pressure to be 
seen to secure the best deal for their national fishing fleets, and uncertainty 
and ignorance about important bio-ecological alongside the weighty socio-
economic implications of fisheries decision-making served to devalue 
scientific advice.89  As a former UK fisheries minister candidly observed on the 
proceedings in Fisheries Council debates,  
‘if you are a fisheries minister you sit around the table arguing about 
fishermen – not about fish.  You’re there to represent your fishermen.  
You’re there to ensure that if there are ten fish you get your share and 
if possible a bit more.  The arguments aren’t about conservation, 
unless of course you are arguing about another country’.90   
 
Under lobbying pressure from the fishing industry, therefore, the Fisheries 
Council consistently declined to take politically unpopular decisions, of 
imposing drastic cuts in TACs or the total closure of some fisheries, even 
where these were emphatically indicated by the scientific advice offered by 
ICES.91  Hence, even when many of the most important commercial stocks, 
such as North Sea Cod, had suffered such serious declines that they are 
threatened with collapse, scientific advice was rarely implemented in full.  For 
example, in 2002, ICES expressed serious concern over the status of Cod 
stocks and recommended a complete moratorium on all catching, whether 
targeted or as a bycatch.  The Commission’s Scientific, Technical and 
Economic Committee on Fisheries accepted this advice, but the Commission 
opted to propose an 80% reduction in the TAC for North Sea Cod.  The 
                                            
88 T. Daw and T. Gray, ‘Fisheries Science and sustainability in international policy: a study of 
the failure in the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy’ (2004) 29 Marine Policy 189, 
s.3.2.   
89 O.S Stokke and C. Coffey, ‘Precaution, ICES and the common fisheries policy: a study of 
regime interplay’ (2004) 28 Marine Policy 117 at p.122.   
90 The Rt Hon John Gummer MP, Chairman of the Marine Stewardship Council and Formerly 
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1989-93) and Secretary of State for the 
Environment (1993-97), speaking at a WWF conference in 1998, quoted by House of Lords 
Select Committee on the European Union, Unsustainable Fishing: What is to be done with the 
Common Fisheries Policy?, (2000) Third Report, Session 2000-01, HL Paper 13, at para.121.  
For an analysis of how national rivalries have contributed to the failure of the CFP, see D. C. 
Payne, ‘Policy Making in Nested Institutions: Explaining the Conservation Failure of the EU’s 
Common Fisheries Policy’ [2000] Journal of Common Market Studies 303.   
91 G. Biais, ‘An evaluation of the policy of fishery resources management by TACs in 
European Community waters from 1983 to 1992’, (1995) 8 Aquatic Living Resources 241 and 
A. Karagiannakos, ‘Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota management system in the 
European Union’ (1996) 20 Marine Policy 235.   
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Council of Ministers eventually agreed on only a 45% reduction in conjunction 
with effort limitations.92   
 
12. The Application of Precaution in TAC Determinations 
 
In the view of the Commission, the solution to the problem of the 
unsatisfactory TAC determination process was to impose mandatory multi-
annual recovery plans where stocks are outside safe biological limits.93  
Recovery plans are to be based on ‘conservation reference points’ with 
targets against which recovery of stocks to safe biological limits are to be 
assessed, based on population size, long term yields, fishing mortality rate 
and/or stability of catches.  Recovery plans must also take account of 
reference points recommended by relevant scientific bodies and to ensure the 
sustainable exploitation of stocks, and that impacts on marine ecosystems are 
kept at sustainable levels.  Perhaps most significantly, these plans are to be 
multi-annual and must indicate the expected time frame for reaching their 
targets.  It is envisaged that the specified targets will be reached by the 
application of ‘harvesting rules which are based upon a pre-determined set of 
biological parameters governing catch limits.94   
 
The significance of the facility for establishment of multi-annual recovery plans 
is potentially immense,95 both in the adoption of a more strategic longer-term 
view of catch limits and in taking the determination of year-upon-year TACs 
out of the arena of annual deliberations at Fishery Council meetings.  
Although the Council is bound to have regard to the economic impact of 
measures that are provided for under recovery plans,96 the legal duty to take a 
long-term strategic approach to the determination of allowable catches, ‘as a 
priority’, arguably, appears to give the need for conservation action a special 
status above socio-economic considerations where biological advice indicates 
stocks are below safe limits.  Insofar as progress towards sustainable 
development is conceived of as an exercise of balancing environmental, 
social and economic considerations against one another, the solution that has 
been adopted in this context may be seen as recognition that ecological 
concerns can justifiably be afforded precedence over other factors where 
precautionary biological limits are exceeded.   
 
13. Illustration in the Cod Recovery Plan 
 
                                            
92 T. Daw and T. Gray, ‘Fisheries Science and sustainability in international policy: a study of 
the failure in the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy’ (2004) 29 Marine Policy 189, 
s.2.   
93 European Commission, Application of the precautionary principle and multiannual 
arrangements for setting TACs, COM(2000) 803 final and Commission Green Paper, The 
future of fisheries policy, COM(2001) 135 final para.5.1.1.   
94 See Art.5 Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002. 
95 See House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Community, Progress of Reform 
of the Common Fisheries Policy, 25th Report Session 2002-03, HL Paper 109 (2003) paras.13 
to 20, though critical comment was made on the delays in putting recovery and management 
plans into place.   
96 Art.5(4)(d) Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002. 
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The first practical test of the recovery plan provisions under the new Basic 
CFP Regulation came with the Fisheries Council meeting of December 
2003.97  At this meeting a Commission proposal for a Cod Recovery Plan98 
was endorsed by the Council and introduced measures aiming to ensure safe 
recovery of stocks to sustainable levels within a time frame of five to ten 
years.99  The recovery plan applied to stocks that were recognised to be in 
danger of collapse and included a combination of low catch limits, fishing 
effort limitations and specific control and monitoring rules to ensure 
implementation.  In accordance with advice from ICES, in consultation with 
the Community’s Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries, 
target stock sizes are based on precautionary levels, incorporating an 
additional safety margin.  Perhaps most significantly, guidelines for setting 
TACs and corresponding fishing effort limits are set out to ensure that the 
greatest annual change in TAC will not be more than 15%.  If the scientific 
advice is that the stock is below safe biological limits, more stringent limits 
may be imposed, such as very low fishing opportunities.  In effect, the horse-
trading involved in annual setting of TACs is removed by these being pre-
determined, within limits, for the duration of the plan.   
 
The model provided by the Cod Recovery Plan has been followed in a 
succession of other multi-annual plans, including plans for northern hake 
stocks (2003) southern hake, Norway lobster and Baltic cod (2005) and plaice 
and sole in the North Sea (2006).100  These plans may be seen as a welcome 
application of a precautionary approach to fisheries management, though 
some years will be needed before their ecological effectiveness becomes 
clear, and initial pessimism about their prospects of success may turn out to 
be unfounded.101  Nonetheless, they raise questions as to what single-species 
plans can achieve within mixed species fisheries.  Notably, the Cod plan does 
not take account of impacts upon other species, or the possible displacement 
effects of fishing being directed to other areas or species.102  Hence, the 
limitations of existing recovery plans may be seen as their species-specific 
character and the lack of a broader ecosystem dimension.   
 
Even within the scope of protecting the named species under the various 
recovery plans, there is little indication so far that they have been successful 
in practical terms.  Given the duration of the recovery plans, it is premature to 
draw any firm conclusions, nonetheless, recent information on fish stocks 
                                            
97 European Commission, Fisheries, Press Release 22 December 2003, Outcome of the 
Fisheries Council of 17-19 December 2003.   
98 Commission Communications, Proposals for Council Regulations establishing measures for 
the recovery of cod and Northern hake stocks, COM(2003) 237 and COM(2003) 374.   
99 See Reg.423/2004 establishing measures for the recovery of cod stocks.   
100 See European Commission, Fisheries, Press Release, European Commission’s proposal 
on fishing possibilities: why and how? 30 November 2005; Joe Borg: Council agreement on 
fishing possibilities for 2006 confirms gradual but sustained approach to stocks recovery, 22 
December 2005; and Plaice and sole in the North Sea: a long-term plan for healthier stocks 
and economic returns, 10 January 2006.  Most recently, see European Commission, Proposal 
for a Council Regulation Establishing a multi-annual plan for the cod stocks of the Baltic Sea 
and the fisheries exploiting those stocks, COM(2006) 411 final.   
101 House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Community, Progress of Reform of 
the Common Fisheries Policy, 25th Report Session 2002-03, HL Paper 109 (2003) Box 1.   
102 Institute for European Environmental Policy, CFP Developments, IEEP Briefing 12 (2003).   
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suggests that progress since they have been put in place, if any, has been 
patchy.  The Commission’s statement of Fishing Opportunities for 2008 
recognises that, although some stocks have recovered and returned within 
safe biological limits, the overall number of stocks at risk appears neither to 
be decreasing nor increasing, with four-fifths of commercial stocks remaining 
outside safe biological limits.  Specifically, it is acknowledged that ‘the 
recovery measures and recovery plan for cod have not brought the 
improvements that were expected’ and that for some cod stocks a 15% 
reduction in TAC will be insufficient to secure significant improvement.103   
 
14. The Ecosystem Approach  
 
At this point, it is convenient to refer back to the element in the reformed CFP 
that requires the Policy to ‘aim at a progressive implementation of an 
ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management.104  As with the 
development of precaution in fisheries, this innovation reflects international 
influences, particularly work undertaken under the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity105 and the 1992 OSPAR Convention106 in this respect.  
Specifically, the Fifth Meeting of the Parties to the Biodiversity Convention in 
2000 produced a call for the general application of the ecosystem approach 
by governments and international organisations, an important attempt to 
define the key elements of the approach and guidance for its 
implementation.107  In 1998, the previous focus upon pollution control in the 
OSPAR Convention was extended by the adoption of Annex V, on the 
Protection of the Ecosystems and Biological Diversity of the North East 
Atlantic, which makes reference to an ‘integrated ecosystem approach’ that 
the Commission is bound to apply.  In 2003, following the first joint Ministerial 
meeting of the Helsinki Commission108 and the OSPAR Commission, the 
parties issued the Bremen Statement which incorporated a further 
commitment of the parties to apply the ecosystem approach109 and reaffirmed 
its Strategy on the Protection and Conservation of Ecosystems and Biological 
Diversity.110  At a global level, the 2002 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
encourages the application of the ecosystem approach by 2010.111  
 
Although the need for an ‘ecosystem approach’ to ecological management 
has gained increasing momentum, precisely what this requires in particular 
                                            
103 European Commission, Fishing Opportunities for 2008 Policy Statement from the 
European Commission, COM(2007) 295 final pp.4 and 10.   
104 Under Art.2(1) Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002.   
105 The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, available at www.biodiv.org.   
106 The 1992 OSPAR Convention on the Protection of the North East Atlantic see 
http://www.ospar.org  
107 See Decision V/6 of the Fifth Meeting of the Parties (2000) at 
www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.asp?lg=O&m-cop-05&d=06. 
108 1974 Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area, available at http://www.helcom.fi/Convention/en_GB/convention/. 
109 For the Bremen Statement, see www.northseaconference.no.  
110 See OSPAR Agreement 2003-21, accessible at 
http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/welcome.html.   
111 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (2002) para.30(d).   
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contexts had been the subject of much debate.112  Perhaps for that reason, 
the rather tentative commitment of the reformed CFP towards its ‘progressive’ 
implementation reflects the uncertainties that are involved.  The concise 
definition of ‘ecosystem approach’ adopted under the Biodiversity Convention 
is ‘a strategy for the integrated management of land, water and living 
resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable 
way’.113  Specifically in relation to fisheries, the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution has suggest that the ‘more holistic’ perspective that is 
the essence of the ecosystem approach,  
‘stands in sharp contrast to previous philosophies for managing the 
marine environment that were fragmented, sectoral and focused on 
short-term economic gain.  Within fisheries management, this change 
in mind-set is illustrated by attempts to move away from managing 
individual fish populations for maximum economic gain towards more 
precautionary controls on fishing that recognise the interdependence of 
predator and prey species within the food chain.  Realising this concept 
will require managers to reconcile a range of issues such as genetic 
and species diversity, species rarity, habitats, food web properties and 
the ecology of marine mammals in a balanced and credible way when 
managing the marine environment.  This will involve incorporating a 
wider range of scientific advice into the management framework.’114   
The implications of all this for the CFP are clearly momentous, but likely to be 
implemented on an incremental way, in an evolutionary rather than a 
revolutionary manner.115  Hence, the emphasis upon ‘progressive’ 
implementation in the reformed CFP may be seen as pragmatic or realistic.   
 
Nonetheless, the question may fairly be raised, to what extent do the new 
provisions for fish stock recovery plans illustrate progress in the holistic 
direction that has been indicated?  The answer seems to be, very little at all.  
The emphasis upon single species management, with no wider ecosystem 
considerations being explicitly incorporated, seems to show a ‘business as 
usual’ approach to fisheries management under the CFP.   
 
Another aspect of the ecosystem approach that seems to be unacknowledged 
in the fish stock recovery plans is the need for ‘adaptive management’ as an 
                                            
112 House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Community, Progress of Reform of 
the Common Fisheries Policy, 25th Report Session 2002-03, HL Paper 109 (2003) para.11.  
There is an extensive literature on ‘ecosystem management’ approach to natural resources 
management, particularly from a United States’ perspective.  A good general survey of the 
issues is provided in R. O. Brooks, R. Jones and R. A. Virginia, Law and Ecology: The Rise of 
the Ecosystem Regime (2002).  For international guidelines on the application of the 
ecosystem approach to fisheries see FAO, Fisheries Management: 2. The ecosystem 
approach to fisheries (2003) (FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries 4, 
Supplement 2).  For a more specific discussion of the application of an ecosystem approach 
to the CFP see, J. G. Pope and D. Symes, An Ecosystem Based Approach to the Common 
Fisheries Policy: Defining the Goals (2000) English Nature.   
113 Para.1 Decision V/6 of the Fifth Meeting of the Parties (2000). 
114 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 25th Report, Turning the Tide: Addressing 
the Impact of Fisheries on the Marine Environment (2004) Cm6392 para.7.38.   
115 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 25th Report, Turning the Tide: Addressing 
the Impact of Fisheries on the Marine Environment (2004) Cm6392 para.7.47.   
 27 
element of the approach.116  Under the Biodiversity Convention, the 
ecosystem approach is seen to require adaptive management to deal with the 
complex and dynamic nature of ecosystems and the absence of complete 
knowledge or understanding of their functioning.  Given the non-linear 
character of ecosystem processes, management must be able to respond to 
such uncertainties and contain elements of ‘learning-by-doing’ or a research 
‘feedback loop’.117  Measures may need to be taken even when some cause-
and-effect relationships are not yet fully established scientifically.118   
 
These features of adaptive management seem admirably relevant to the 
setting of TACs under a fish stock recovery plan which is put in place to run 
over a number of years, and where continuing information about levels of the 
stock may necessitate rethinking of whether the plan is on course to achieve 
its objectives or not.  Despite the potential of adaptive management as a tool 
for determining variation in TACs in the light of subsequent information, it 
does not seem to have featured explicitly in the determination of limits for 
TACs in the duration of recovery plans.  Possibly, on a generous 
interpretation, the mechanisms for determining TACs within limits might, in 
effect, be seen as an implicit application of a kind of adaptive management.  
Nonetheless, the extent to which the measures have been purposefully 
introduced to meet the adaptive management element of the ecosystem 
approach, and whether and how they meet it, is obscure.   
 
15. Nature Conservation under the CFP 
 
The most prominent application of a precautionary and ecosystem-orientated 
approach under the reformed CFP may be seen in the provision for 
emergency measures for nature conservation.119  Alongside the emergency 
powers given to the Commission,120 new powers are given to member states 
to take emergency measures within their jurisdiction.  These measures may 
be introduced in the event of fishing activities giving rise to a ‘serious and 
unforeseen’ threat to the conservation of living aquatic resources or the 
marine ecosystem, requiring action where ‘undue delay would result in 
damage that would be difficult to repair’.  However, the exercise of the 
emergency powers is for a maximum of three months and is subject to a 
requirement to notify the Commission of an intention to introduce measures, 
and a power of the Commission to confirm, cancel or amend measures.121  
                                            
116 For discussion of the regulatory difficulties in applying adaptive management see J. B. 
Rhul, ‘Regulation by Adaptive Management – is it Possible? (2005) 7 Minnesota Journal of 
Law, Science and Technology 21 and B. C. Kirkkainen, ‘Panarchy and Adaptive Change: 
Around the Loop and Back Again’ (2005) 7 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and 
Technology 59.   
117 On the feedback loop and other ‘decision rules’ relating to adaptive management, see J. 
Cooke and M. Earle, ‘Towards a Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management’ (1993) 
RECIEL 252, at p.256.   
118 Para.4 Decision V/6 of the Fifth Meeting of the Parties (2000). 
119 For a more general discussion of the issues, see D. Symes, The integration of fisheries 
management and marine wildlife conservation (1998) (published by the Joint Nature 
Conservation Committee, JNCC Report No.287).   
120 Art.7 Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002.   
121 Art.8 Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002.   
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Other powers of member states to take conservation action arise in relation to 
measures with the 12 nautical mile coastal zone122 and in respect of 
measures applicable solely to fishing vessels flying the flag of the member 
state.123   
 
16. Application of the Emergency Powers for Conservation 
 
Although the powers of the Commission and member states to limit fishing for 
conservation reasons is a welcome development in the progression towards 
ecosystem management, the critical issues are about when the Commission 
will use, or sanction the use of, these powers.  On this, the initial indications 
are ambivalent.124   
 
The discovery of cold water coral populations in the Darwin mounds, an area 
of 100 square km located 1 km below the surface in an area 185 km north-
west of Cape Wrath, was the first test of the emergency powers.  As a habitat 
categorised as a ‘reef’ under Habitats Directive,125 the area was recognised to 
be of considerable conservation importance, whilst having been damaged by 
benthic trawling activities and under threat of further destruction by these 
activities.  Following a campaign by the WWF,126 the European Commission 
responded to the UK’s request that the Commission’s emergency powers 
should be used to ban the use of damaging kinds of fishing gear within the 
area.  The Commission recognised that a precautionary approach must be 
taken to minimise the impact of fishing activities on important and sensitive 
ecosystems.  In the first instance, the Commission response took the form of 
an emergency measure applicable for a six-month period.127  This was 
followed by a permanent measure128 which prohibited fishing vessels from 
using bottom trawls or similar towed nets, operating in contact with the bottom 
of the sea, in an area bounded by coordinates encompassing the Darwin 
Mounds.  This outcome represents an important departure in illustrating the 
first use of powers under the CFP being used to conserve ecosystems rather 
than, as previously, to limit exploitation of fish stocks.   
                                            
122 Art.9 Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002.   
123 Art.10 Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002.  Generally, see D. Owen, Interaction between EU 
Common Fisheries Policy and the Habitats and Birds Directive (2004) (Institute for European 
Environmental Policy).   
124 See E. M. De Santo and P. J. S. Jones, ‘Offshore marine conservation policies in the 
North East Atlantic: Emerging tensions and opportunities’, (2007) Marine Policy 336 at section 
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125 Notably, in R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Greenpeace (No.2) 
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of the Directive had been expressed in European Commission, Fisheries Management and 
Nature Conservation in the Marine Environment, COM(1999) 363 final, at para.5.2.2.   
126 See World Wildlife Fund United Kingdom, The Darwin Mounds: Out of Sight and Still 
Under Threat (2001).   
127 Commission Reg.1475/2003 on the protection of deep-water coral reefs from the effects of 
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extended the operation of the earlier measure for a further six-month period.   
128 Commission Reg.602/2004 amending Regulation EC No.850/98 as regards the protection 
of deep-water coral reefs from the effects of trawling in an area north west of Scotland.   
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On the other hand, the response of the Commission to requests by the UK to 
ban pair-trawling for bass in the English Channel may be seen as less 
encouraging.  The practice of pair trawling, involving the use of a pelagic net 
towed between two vessels, was seen as problematic by the UK because of 
the high level of cetacean bycatch, particularly dolphins, reported to arise from 
this method of fishing.129  The UK sought a ban on pair-trawling to fulfil 
obligations to protect cetaceans under Habitats Directive in respect of 
measures ensuring that incidental killing does not have a negative impact on 
such species.130  In 2004, the UK’s request that the Commission impose an 
emergency closure of the English Channel pair-trawl fishery131 was rejected.  
This was because, in the view of the Commission, the need for immediate 
action was not shown, because the bycatch information did not provide any 
radically new evidence on the level of threat to cetaceans.  Moreover, a ban 
on pair trawling in this area might result in a redistribution of fishing effort 
elsewhere without necessarily reducing the overall bycatch of cetaceans.  In 
2005, the Commission also rejected a request to extend closure of the pair 
trawl fishery to vessels of all member states132 for similar reasons.133   
 
The result of the Commission’s responses to the requests was that the 
problem could only be partially addressed by UK national legislation134 
prohibiting UK fishing vessels from pair-trawling both within UK and EC 
waters.  This might be seen as an unsatisfactorily unilateral response insofar 
as the activity of pair-trawling in the English Channel was predominantly 
undertaken by French vessels, and these vessels would not be subject to the 
UK Order.  The effectiveness of the Order in respect of its impact upon 
cetacean conservation was also disputable.  Nonetheless, in an unsuccessful 
legal challenge to the Order, it was observed that it was not unreasonable to 
introduce a UK measure for the purpose of demonstrating national 
commitment on the issue and as a means of pressing for action at Community 
level.135   
 
The contrast between the uses of emergency measures for conservation 
purpose in the Darwin Mounds and the Pair-trawling situations perhaps 
illustrates the differences in the evidence that is needed to justify their use in 
relation to geographically limited and static habitats, in the first case, and in 
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9 of Council Regulation (EC) No.2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation 
of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy.   
134 South-west Territorial Waters (Prohibition of Pair Trawling) Order 2004 SI2004/3397, 
made under s.5A Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1967.   
135 See Greenpeace Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
[2005] EWHC 2144 (QBD Admin) at para.66 and [2005] EWCA Civ 1656 (CA Civ Div).   
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relation to mobile species that range over a wide area, in the second.136  
Equally, the certainty of future damage to the coral reefs in the first case may 
be seen to contrast with the uncertain ecological benefit of restrictions in the 
second.  In the balance between taking a precautionary approach and acting 
on the basis of the ‘sound scientific advice’,137 the Darwin Mounds response 
shows a preference for the former, whilst the Pair-trawling decisions take their 
justification from the latter.  Arguably, both cases were resolved in accordance 
with the requirements that the emergency powers should be exercised only 
where there is evidence of a ‘serious threat’138 to the conservation of living 
aquatic resources.  However, the apparent need for compelling evidence of 
this, as illustrated in the latter case, suggests that less weight is given to 
precaution in the exercise of the emergency powers that might be envisaged, 
given the general emphasis upon precaution in the stated objectives of the 
Basic CFP Regulation.   
 
17. A Conservation-based Interpretation of ‘Precaution’ 
 
Stepping temporarily outside the context of the CFP, it is possible to see a 
significantly different approach to ‘precaution’ being adopted in a comparable 
nature conservation context.139  The ‘Wadden Sea Shellfishery’ case140 
involved referral proceedings from the Netherlands before the European Court 
of Justice on the interpretation of the Habitats Directive.141  The Court found 
that granting annual licences for mechanical cockle fishing constituted a ‘plan’ 
                                            
136 See E. M. De Santo and P. J. S. Jones, ‘Offshore marine conservation policies in the 
North East Atlantic: Emerging tensions and opportunities’, (2007) Marine Policy 336 at 
sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
137 See Art.2(1) Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002 (requiring application of the precautionary 
approach) and Art.2(2) (requiring decision-making to be based on sound scientific advice).  
The counterparts of these provisions in the Community Environment Policy are to be found in 
Art.174(2) and 174(3) of the EC Treaty, though the latter refers to ‘available’, rather than 
‘sound’, scientific advice.   
138 Art.7(1) Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002 requires a ‘serious threat’ to be shown, Art.8(1) 
requires a ‘serious and unforeseen’ threat to be shown and that undue delay would result in 
damage that would be difficult to repair.   
139 On the close interrelationship between the CFP and nature conservation, see European 
Commission, Action Plan on Fisheries and Biodiversity COM(2001) 162 final, (which 
proposed management objectives and measures in relation to the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity in fisheries); European Commission, Thematic Strategy on the 
Protection and Conservation of the Marine Environment, COM(2005) 504 final (which seeks 
to protect and restore Europe’s oceans and seas to ensure that human activities are 
conducted in a sustainable manner); the Proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for 
Community action in the field of marine environmental policy, SEC(2005) 1290 (which will 
require marine waters to achieve ‘good ecological status’); and the Green Paper on Maritime 
Policy, Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union: a European vision of the oceans and 
seas, COM(2006) 275 final (which generally considers the new tools and modes of maritime 
governance that need to be adopted for sustainable maritime industries).   
140 Case C-127/02 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse 
Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en 
Visserij, ECJ 7 September 2004.  For commentary on this, see J. Verschuuren, ‘Shellfish for 
Fishermen or for Birds? Article 6 Habitats Directive and the Precautionary Principle’ [2005] 
Journal of Environmental Law 265 and E. R. Stokes, ‘Liberalising the Threshold of Precaution 
– Cockle Fishing, the Habitats Directive, and Evidence of a New Understanding of Scientific 
Uncertainty’ [2005] Environmental Law Review 206.   
141 Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats of wild fauna and flora.   
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or ‘project’ under the Directive, which needed an ‘appropriate assessment’ of 
its significant effects upon a special protection area designated for the 
protection of shellfish-eating birds.142  Moreover, appropriate assessment was 
needed if any reasonable scientific doubt remained as to the adverse effects 
of shellfish harvesting on the food supply of the protected birds.  Although 
determined in the context of habitat conservation legislation, the need for 
precaution in fishery licensing within the protected area may be seen as 
uncompromising in requiring that significant conservation risks are shown to 
be excluded on the basis of objective information.  This illustrates a 
particularly strong interpretation of ‘precaution’, which requires the use of 
ecological information positively to exclude any probability of risk to the 
conservation objectives of a designated site.  In effect, the burden of showing 
no significant harm is placed upon the party seeking to undertake an activity, 
or at least to grant a licence to allow the activity to be undertaken.   
 
It may fairly be noted that conservation and fisheries are governed by 
separate Community legislation and the transference of this strict approach to 
precaution from the former area to the latter may not always be justified.  
However, the apparent rationale for the application of precaution in the 
Wadden Sea Shellfishery Case was that, 
‘the precautionary principle is one of the foundations of the high level of 
protection pursued by Community policy on the environment . . . and by 
reference to which the Habitats Directive must be interpreted’.143   
By the same reasoning, it might be contended that all Community secondary 
legislation, including that based upon non-environmental Articles of the EC 
Treaty, such as the CFP,144 should be interpreted so as to apply precaution in 
an analogous way. 
 
To some extent, this issue takes the discussion back to the precise meaning 
of the integration requirement and the interpretation of whether ‘integration’ 
requires that environmental principles,  
‘must be put into effect in connection with every single measure 
enacted or to be enacted by the Community, or whether the 
environmental policy or policies in other areas respectively are to be 
considered as points of reference in the sense that the entirety of 
Community measures should meet the requirements of the action 
principles from a global point of view’.145   
Because of the uncertainty of the relevant EC Treaty provisions,146 and 
particularly the ambiguity of the phrase ‘environmental protection 
requirements’ in the integration obligation,147 the answer to this fundamental 
question is far from clear.  One perceptive suggestion is that the ambiguity 
                                            
142 Under Art.6(3) Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC.   
143 Case C-127/03, at para.44.   
144 The present Basic CFP Regulation, Reg.2371/2002, is founded upon Art.37 of the EC 
Treaty, under Title III on Agriculture, though recital 3, concerned with the need for sustainable 
exploitation is stated to be based on the same considerations as the precautionary principle 
referred to in Art.174, under Title XIX, Environment, of the Treaty.   
145 A. Epiney, ‘Environmental Principles’ in R. Macrory, Ed. Reflections on 30 Years of EU 
Environmental Law (2006) p.17 at p.31.   
146 Particularly, Art.174(2)(2) and Art.6 EC Treaty.   
147 N. Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection into other EC Policies (2003) p.15.   
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might be resolved through an appreciation that ‘integration’ might be 
conceived of in either procedural of substantive terms, whereas the actual 
integration requirement that has been provided for in the EC Treaty is of the 
former but not the latter kind.   
‘Hence, ‘it is one thing to consider environmental concerns in the 
context of a sectoral policy (the procedural requirement for integration), 
but it is another matter to define the degree to which such integration 
should take place in practice (the substantive requirement of 
integration) and to declare an EC act void on those grounds’.148   
Given the wide discretion given to Community institutions in respect of 
application of the integration requirement, there is some cogency to the 
suggestion that adherence to substantive integration requirements is not 
required.  Arguably, the ‘manifest error of appraisal’ test149 would be more 
readily satisfied where an institution denied the need for integration per se 
rather than where it misinterpreted what it required in a particular context.  All 
this may seem rather discouraging from an environmental perspective.  On 
the other hand, expectations may have been raised higher than a careful 
analysis of the wording of the integration obligation would have deserved.   
 
18. Strict Precaution and Fisheries 
 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Wadden Sea Shellfishery Case is 
the strictness of the interpretation of ‘precaution’ that was adopted.  This 
involved showing that the activity involved would not harm the conservation 
objectives of the designated site and placed the burden of showing this, 
beyond reasonable scientific doubt, upon those entrusted with the 
authorisation of the activity.  On this strict interpretation of ‘precaution’, 
suspicion alone justifies the actor being presumed to be guilty until innocence 
is shown.150  Not only does uncertainty as to ecological harm serve as a 
ground for the prohibition of an activity, but the absence of uncertainty must 
be conclusively established before the activity can be allowed.  In a fishery 
context, this might be interpreted as requiring that all fishing activity should be 
prohibited unless those seeking to authorise or engage in it are able to 
establish beyond doubt that no ecological harm will ensue as a consequence.   
 
Clearly, the version of the precaution found in the reformed CFP falls 
significantly short of what would be required by this kind of strict precaution.  
For example, a recent statement from the Commission reads as follows. 
‘For a number of stocks no biological advice or information is available 
from STECF [the Commission’s Scientific, Technical and Economic 
Committee on Fisheries].  In these cases, the precautionary approach, 
as incorporated in the CFP, can be applied without reference to 
scientific advice.  In these cases, the guiding principle can be that no 
expansion of the fishery should be foreseen because there are no 
scientific data showing that such an expansion could be sustainable.  
                                            
148 D. Grimeaud, ‘The Integration of environmental Concerns into EC Policies: A Genuine 
Policy Development’ (2000) European Environmental Law Review 207, at p.216.   
149 See section 3 above on ‘manifest error of appraisal’.   
150 See J. Holder, ‘Safe Science? The precautionary principle in UK environmental law’, in J. 
Holder, Ed., The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the United Kingdom (1997) at p.125 
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Where current TACs are substantially higher than the real recent 
catches, they would be adapted towards the real catches at a rate of 
15% per year.’151  
In this version of ‘precaution’, it seems that there is no incompatibility between 
the continuation of fishing activity and a total absence of information on 
impacts on fish stocks or the marine environment, albeit ‘precaution’ serves to 
prevent any expansion of the fishery and may allow for a gradual reduction of 
TACs where these are ‘substantially higher’ than recent catches.  On the 
scale of strictness of precaution, this approach must stand somewhere near 
the opposite end of the spectrum from that adopted in the Wadden Sea 
Shellfishery Case.   
 
Nevertheless, the question is justifiably raised, whether strict precaution has 
any place in fisheries management.  Historically at least, the answer to this 
seems to be in the affirmative.  An early illustration of the application of this 
kind of precaution to fisheries is to be seen in United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions152 concerning the prohibition of driftnet fishing on the 
high seas.153  Resolution 44/255 of 1989 recommended a global moratorium 
on high seas driftnets, to be implemented unless nations have taken effective 
conservation and management measures based on statistically sound 
analysis to prevent the unacceptable impacts of the practice.  This Resolution 
recognised the uncertainty that existed in the information regarding high seas 
drift-net fishing, but provided for a moratorium based on concerns about over-
exploitation of target stocks and an unacceptable by-catch of non-target 
species.  It has been suggested that this resolution reversed the normal 
burden of proof in that it required measures to be taken first, with their 
subsequent relaxation allowed for only where scientific research 
demonstrates convincingly that they are not necessary.  In effect, the 
continuation of drift-net fishing is dependent on evidence showing that 
effective conservation and management measures are in place to prevent 
unacceptable impacts and to secure conservation.  Showing this involves the 
provision of a statistically sound analysis jointly made by those with an 
interest in the fishery.154   
                                            
151 European Commission, Fishing Opportunities for 2008 Policy Statement from the 
European Commission, COM(2007) 295 final p.10.   
152 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/255 (of 22 December 1989) 
concerning high seas driftnet fishing: Large-Scale Pelagic Fishing and Its Impacts on the on 
the Living Resources of the World’s oceans and Seas’ (operative from 30 June 1992) ((1990) 
29 ILM 1556 and www.un.org/documents/resga.htm).  Subsequently, see Resolutions 45/197 
of 1990, 46/215 of 1991, 47/443 of 1992 and 48/445 of 1993 and for discussion of these see 
G. J. Hewison, ‘The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management: An Environmental 
Perspective’ (1996) 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 301, at p.305.   
153 For a discussion of contrasting views on the issues, see D. Hunter, J. Salzman and D. 
Zaelke, International Environmental Law and Policy (2nd ed. 2002) pp.699 to 707.  For 
discussion of the driftnet ban and other examples of precaution in international fisheries law, 
see D. Freestone, ‘International Fisheries Law Since Rio: the Continued Rise of Precaution’ 
and W. Edson, ‘Towards Long-term Sustainable Use: Some Recent Developments in the 
Legal Regime for Fisheries’ in A. Boyle and D. Freestone eds., International Law and 
Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (1999) at pp.135 and 
165 respectively.   
154 S. M. Garcia, ‘The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fishery 
Management’ (1994) 22 Ocean & Coastal Management 99, at p.103. 
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Within the CFP, a close counterpart of this approach is to be seen in 
Community measures restricting the use of driftnets.  The controversy over 
application of strict precaution at a global level was paralleled by a challenge 
to a Community Regulation banning driftnets longer than 2.5 kilometres.155  In 
the Mondiet Case,156 the validity of the Regulation was disputed on the basis 
that it was not justified on scientific grounds, since the Council had not taken 
into account scientific advice on the threats to fish stocks when adopting the 
measure.  In effect, the argument was that strict precaution was reviewable 
where there was insufficient evidence of ecological harm to justify its 
application.  However, the European Court of Justice held that conservation 
measures need not be in precise conformity with scientific advice and the 
absence of such information should not prevent the Council from adopting 
measures that are deemed essential for the attainment of the objectives of the 
CFP.  In effect, the discretion of the Council could not be challenged because 
of the lack of scientific certainty as to the need for the Regulation.  The 
precautionary principle, interpreted strictly, was recognised as having a role to 
play in respect of actions that are taken in circumstances of scientific 
uncertainty.  This ruling is particularly remarkable because the Regulation at 
issue was adopted outside the Environment Title of the EC Treaty157 and 
demonstrates the use of environmental action principles as a basis for review 
and interpretation of non-environmental legislation.158   
 
19. The Revival of Strict Precaution? 
 
Since the measures concerning driftnets, the application of strict precaution to 
fisheries seems to have fallen into abeyance.  However, arguments for its 
revival have resurfaced from time to time.  Fairly recently, for example, the 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution recommended an 
uncompromising strict interpretation of precaution in suggesting,  
‘the presumption in favour of fishing should be reversed.  Applicants for 
fishing rights . . . should have to demonstrate that the effects of their 
activity would not harm the seas’ long-term environmental 
sustainability.159   
                                            
155 Reg. 345/92, amending Regulation 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for 
the conservation of fishery resources, made reference to United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 44/255 (see 14th recital).  Notably, Art.9a of the Regulation provided for a time-
limited derogation that could only be extended where the Council was satisfied, in the light of 
scientific evidence, that there was no ecological risk involved.  Again, this may be seen as 
showing a reversal of the usual burden of proof.  For more recent developments in EC 
legislation concerning regulation of drift nets see, European Commission, Proposal for a 
Council Regulation amending Regulations (EC) No 894/97, (EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 
2187/2005 as concerns drift nets, COM(2006) 511 final and Council Reg.809/2007 giving 
effect to this proposal.   
156 Case C-405/92 Etablissements A. Mondiet SA v Armement Islais SARL [1993] ECR-I 
6133.   
157 Reg.345/92 amended Reg.3094/86 which makes reference to Reg.170/83, initially 
establishing the CFP.  Reg.170/83 was adopted under the Agriculture Title of the EC Treaty, 
then Art.43 now Art.37.  See discussion of this at 5 above.   
158 N. Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection into other EC Policies (2003) at p.169.   
159 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Turning the Tide, 25th Report Cm6392 
(2004) para.7.59.   
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This interpretation of ‘precaution’ is not radically new in relation to fisheries 
management.  A strong emphasis upon information requirements as a 
prerequisite to fishing activity has been advocated by environmental non-
governmental organisations over many years.  Hence, it has been suggested 
that, 
‘no new fishery should be established or existing fishery expanded until 
a scientifically-based management plan has been drawn up that has 
been shown, by simulation or otherwise, to be capable of ensuring 
sustainability with high probability under a wide range of possible 
scenarios with respect to the dynamics of the stocks and ecological 
interactions.’160   
From an ecological perspective, strict precaution is seen as a justification for 
the reversal of the burden of proof in recognition of the considerable scientific 
uncertainties that are involved.  At the very least, the absence of information 
about a fishery should be seen as a reason for cautious exploitation and the 
greater the uncertainty the greater the need for caution.  Most notably 
however, this approach places the burden of proof of showing that fishery 
impacts will be acceptable upon the management system or, in the most 
extreme interpretation, upon those who seek to be engaged in fishing.161  
Given that fisheries research is generally recognised to be ‘very expensive’,162 
the economic cost of discharging that burden is likely to be considerable.   
 
The ecologists’ argument is founded upon a premise that marine ecosystems 
should be preserved in a condition that is close to their unexploited state.  
Stock levels should not be exploited below their natural range of variation in 
abundance so that average biomass should remain at a level that is high in 
comparison with the average biomass that would exist if fishing did not take 
place.  Hence, it is advocated that intensity of fishing ‘should not substantially 
distort the character of the ecosystem’ and,  
‘that each management plan should be able to demonstrate high 
statistical probability that catches do not reduce the average biomass 
of either target or non-target species by more than 20% compared to 
the expected average biomass in the absence of fishing, unless a 
greater removal can be shown not to have a detrimental effect on the 
ecosystem.’163   
This is perhaps the most extreme formulation of ‘precaution’ that has ever 
been suggested in a fishery management context, in combining the reversal 
of the burden of proof with a challengingly specific and stringent specification 
of what needs to be proved.  It is not clear why a 20% departure of fish stocks 
from a pristine (unfished) state should be chosen as a benchmark for 
                                            
160 J. Cooke and M. Earle, ‘Towards a Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management’ 
(1993) RECIEL 252, at p.258.  Similarly, see Greenpeace International, A Precautionary 
Approach to Fisheries (1994).  For a more detailed discussion of the implications of the 
approach that is advocated, see G. J. Hewitson, ‘The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries 
Management: An Environmental Perspective’ [1996] International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 301, pp.318 to 329.    
161 S. M. Garcia, ‘The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fishery 
Management’ (1994) 22 Ocean & Coastal Management 99, at p.107.   
162 European Commission, Biodiversity Action Plan for Fisheries COM(2001) 162, para.66.   
163 J. Cooke and M. Earle, ‘Towards a Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management’ 
(1993) RECIEL 252, at p.258.   
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sustainability, but it is evident that showing this, and the absence of ‘distortion’ 
in the ecosystem, would constitute a formidable scientific challenge for those 
seeking to authorise, or engage in, fishing activities.   
 
Is this a model for the kind of ‘precaution’ that needs to be adopted in the 
CFP?  The ‘manager’s dilemma’, shared by those entrusted with the 
regulation of fisheries, is that  
‘by always leaning backwards in regulation, giving to the resources the 
benefit of the doubt, he might come up with reasonable assurance of 
protecting the resource, except that the economic survival of thousands 
of individuals, hundreds of communities and dozens of countries may 
be affected by the administrative action taken.164 
In short, whilst the precautionary principle is capable of providing an 
opportunity to ensure sustainable fisheries development, ‘its careless 
generalisation to fisheries could, however, lead to economic and social chaos 
in the fishing industry’165 and depriving consumers of a valuable product.  The 
important point here is that precautionary action needs to be cost-effective or 
proportionate to the gravity of the problem that it is seeking to address.  
Precautionary measures in fisheries have a socio-economic cost which may 
be excessive if measures exceed what is needed to ensure the sustainability 
of a fishery.  Moreover, given the uncertainties involved, there is no way of 
knowing in advance whether any particular measure is more precautionary 
than is needed to achieve social, economic and environmental sustainability 
of fishing activities.  There are, therefore, good reasons to be cautious about 
over-precaution in fisheries.  The challenge is that of reducing ecological risks 
to acceptable levels, rather than totally excluding those risks, and doing this in 
a way that reflects the benefits of fish harvesting to consumers, communities 
and fishers.166   
 
On the question of whether the approach to ‘precaution’ that has been 
adopted in the reformed CFP has achieved this balance or not, the jury is still 
out.  More time is needed to assess the ecological effectiveness of the 
recovery plans that have been put in place and to ascertain whether the 
powers to adopt emergency measures for conservation area being sufficiently 
widely applied.  What seems clear is that ‘precaution’ in fisheries is a matter of 
degree and, if the present version is not sufficient, there are other markedly 
more stringent variants waiting in the wings to address and continuing 
problems of ecological unsustainability in the CFP.   
 
20. Concluding Observations 
 
                                            
164 S. M. Garcia, ‘The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fishery 
Management’ (1994) 22 Ocean & Coastal Management 99, at p.103, quoting, with added 
emphasis, M. C. James, ‘Fishery Administrators’ Problems’, Proceedings of the Gulf of 
Caribbean Fisheries Institute, Third Annual Session (November 1950) 13.   
165 S. M. Garcia, ‘The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fishery 
Management’ (1994) 22 Ocean & Coastal Management 99, at p.100.   
166 More generally on the potentially ‘paralysing’ effect of precaution and the danger of lost 
‘opportunity costs’ to which it gives rise see C. R. Sustein, ‘Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle’ (2003) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1003 and, for a range of critical 
views, see J. Morris, Ed., Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle (2000).   
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In reviewing the application of the precautionary principle in the CFP, it has 
been apparent that securing sustainable management of harvested natural 
resources raises significantly different issues from those arising in other 
environmental contexts where precaution has been called into play.  The need 
for a precautionary approach is activated by scientific uncertainty as to 
serious or irreversible impacts of an activity.  Fisheries management abounds 
with scientific uncertainties, but these uncertainties are of a different kind to 
those that arise in other environmental contexts.  The general character of 
ecological impacts of fishing are fairly well appreciated, but precaution needs 
to be applied in determining the extent, rather than the nature, of those 
impacts.  This exercise needs to be undertaken against a background of value 
judgments as to the bounds of ecological acceptability and the socio-
economic costs that are justifiably incurred in securing an ecologically 
acceptable level of exploitation.   
 
Although the Community’s Environment Policy and the integration obligation 
have provided good starting points for the discussion, they are less helpful in 
relation to challenge of securing sustainable fishery management than they 
might be in other environmental contexts.  The need to apply the 
precautionary principle to the ‘prudent and rational utilisation of natural 
resources’ stands in direct opposition to the need to take account of ‘available 
scientific data’, particularly where that data is incomplete or uncertain.  
Essentially the same underlying tension is reflected in the CFP which seeks to 
take a precautionary approach to fisheries management and yet requires a 
decision-making process based on ‘sound scientific advice’.167  Information 
deficit seems equally capable of being used as a justification for action or 
inaction.   
 
Within the CFP, regulatory and management mechanisms have previously 
been catastrophically unsuccessful in reconciling the environmental, social 
and economic objectives of the policy.  The wording of the reformed CFP 
gives prominence to a precautionary approach and the need to reduce 
ecosystem impacts, but it may take some time for the substantial impact of 
these developments to become apparent.  In practical terms, the methodology 
of determining TACs according to multiannual plans based upon biological 
reference points, including sufficient safety margins, has the attraction of 
shielding these determinations from undue political interference.  
Nonetheless, some time will be needed to ascertain whether multiannual 
recovery plans are sufficient to bring stocks back to sustainable levels and 
whether they are adequate to address broader ecosystem impacts.  Similarly, 
whilst the provisions for emergency measures to be taken for conservation 
purposes under the reformed CFP are welcome, the stringency of the 
scientific evidence that is required to activate such actions will be a test of 
how ‘precautionary’ these provisions really are.  Again, the initial indications 
seem to suggest that actions will be based on ‘sound science’ rather than 
making allowances for scientific uncertainty.  The problems of disentangling 
rhetoric and reality in the CFP are as great as ever.   
 
                                            
167 Contrast, Art.2(1) with Art.2(2)(b) in the Basic CFP Reg.2371/2002. 
 38 
Given the alarmingly over-exploited state of Community fish stocks and the 
serious damage inflicted upon marine ecosystems by fishing activities, the 
developments in the CFP have considerable potential to secure greater 
sustainability.  Whether sustainability will actually be achieved or not is an 
open question, answerable only in the light of the experience gained by some 
years of operation of the reformed Policy.  By some comparisons that have 
been drawn, the interpretation of ‘precaution’ that has been adopted in the 
reformed CFP is relatively moderate.  There may be good reasons for that 
moderation given the unwarranted socio-economic costs of taking an over-
precautionary approach.  Whether a sufficient degree of stringency towards 
precaution has been adopted in the reformed CAP must depend upon 
whether it actually succeeds in bringing stocks back to safe levels and 
preventing unacceptable levels of ecosystem damage.  As has been seen, 
‘precaution’ is a matter of degree in fisheries management.  In the event of the 
reformed CFP failing to achieve its objectives, a stricter kind of precaution will 
be needed.   
 
